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INTRODUCTION

Comparative fault ameliorates the harsh effects of the all-ornothing defense of contributory negligence and provides a
mechanism for the apportionment of fault among those whose
1
fault caused loss or damage to an injured plaintiff or plaintiffs.
One of the perplexing problems in construing comparative fault
statutes is in determining whose fault should be considered in the
apportionment of fault in tort litigation, and more specifically,
whether the fault of nonparties should be considered in the
allocation of fault, and if so, which nonparties.
The nonparty issue inheres in any comparative negligence or
fault statute. While the issue is sometimes directly addressed in a
statute, often it is not. Minnesota’s comparative negligence and
fault statutes did not directly address that question, leaving it to the
courts to resolve the issue.
Minnesota’s Comparative Fault Act is a modified comparative
fault statute. A plaintiff will be barred from recovery if the
plaintiff’s fault is greater than the fault of the person from whom
2
recovery is sought. In general, Minnesota requires individual
3
comparisons of fault. A plaintiff will be barred from recovery if the
plaintiff’s fault is greater than the fault of each individual
4
defendant.
Minnesota’s default rule is several liability. That means that
defendants will be held liable for only their percentage of fault
5
unless one of the four joint and several liability exceptions applies,

†
Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
1. 1 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1:1 (3d ed. 2015).
2. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (2014).
3. Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1982); Marier
v. Mem’l Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 246, 207 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1973).
Cambern points out that aggregate comparisons of fault will be permitted only in
limited cases, one of which is where the defendants are involved in a joint venture.
323 N.W.2d at 798 (citing Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn.
200, 209–10, 203 N.W.2d 841, 847 (1973)). For a more detailed discussion, see
Michael K. Steenson, The Fault with Comparative Fault: The Problem of Individual
Comparisons in a Modified Comparative Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1
(1986).
4. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1.
5. Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1.
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one of which imposes joint and several liability on a defendant who
is more than 50% at fault.
The greater the distribution of fault, the greater the likelihood
that any individual defendant will be held severally liable rather
than jointly and severally liable. This means that the issue of whose
fault is included in the allocation of fault will be critical, not only in
determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover against any
individual defendant, but also whether any given defendant will be
only severally liable or jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.
The rule of several liability became the default rule in
Minnesota in a 2003 amendment to the Comparative Fault Act.
Section 604.02, subdivision 1 of the Act reads in part as follows:
“When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to
awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable
to each,” subject to four enumerated exceptions where joint and
6
several liability continues to apply.
A loss reallocation statute, enacted in 1978, further provides
that if a party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible
after the entry of judgment, it must be reallocated among the
remaining parties to the litigation according to their respective
7
percentages of fault.
The problem of determining whose fault should be considered
in the apportionment of fault has persisted from the time of the
adoption of the comparative negligence statute in 1969, through
the adoption of the 1978 and 2003 amendments. If anything,
inconsistencies in the language in the amendments amplified the
problem. The Minnesota Supreme Court had previously
determined that the fault of certain nonparties should be
considered in the allocation of fault, but not in cases arising after
the 2003 amendment. The issues of whether the fault of nonparties
should be considered in the apportionment of fault under postamendment section 604.02, subdivision 1 and its impact on those
who were parties to the litigation remained unresolved until the
8
supreme court’s decisions in Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud in 2012 and
9
2014.

6.
7.
8.
9.
2014).

Id.
Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 2.
Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab I), 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012).
Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab II), 853 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn.
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The plaintiff in the case was injured at a parish school, owned
and operated by the diocese, when her husband pushed her
wheelchair over a five-inch drop, causing her to pitch forward and
10
out of the chair. The plaintiff brought suit against the Diocese of
11
St. Cloud. At trial, the fault of the diocese and the plaintiff’s
husband was submitted to the jury, which found both to be at
12
fault. The jury allocated 50% of the fault to the diocese and 50%
13
to the husband, even though he was not a party to the litigation.
Staab I required the supreme court to consider for the first
time the impact of the legislature’s 2003 amendment of Minnesota
Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 1 of the Comparative Fault Act.
That amendment was the culmination of years of legislative erosion
of the rule of joint and several liability, a process that began in 1978
and concluded in the 2003 legislative amendments, making several
14
liability the default rule, subject to limited exceptions.
The court construed the amendment to mean that “persons
15
. . . severally liable” includes nonparties, and held that Mr. Staab’s
fault was appropriately considered in the apportionment of fault in
16
the case, and that the consequence was that the other severally
liable party, the diocese, would be held liable for only its
17
percentage of fault.
In Staab II, decided two years later, the supreme court held
that the loss reallocation statute in section 604.02, subdivision 2,
which requires reallocation of the uncollectible share of a party
(defined to include a non-party), could not be applied to increase
18
the liability of a severally liable party.
The upshot of the Staab decisions is that where the fault of a
nonparty is considered, it will have consequences, one of which is
that the parties to a lawsuit will be held liable only for their
percentages of fault, unless one of the joint and several liability

10. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 71.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. For a more detailed analysis of the changes, see Michael K. Steenson,
Joint and Several Liability in Minnesota: The 2003 Model, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 845
(2004).
15. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 76.
16. Id. at 80.
17. Id.
18. Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 719.
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exceptions applies, and that the loss reallocation statute cannot be
used to increase the obligation of a severally liable party.
Staab I and II resolved two of the issues concerning the
allocation of fault. Others remain, however, including the
circumstances under which the fault of nonparties will be
considered; the rule of loss reallocation and its relationship to joint
and several liability; the impact of the Staab decisions on products
liability loss reallocation, which is subject to a special reallocation
rule; and, finally, the impact of the decisions on cases involving
third-party contribution claims against employers.
The purpose of this article is to address these issues in depth.
Part II is a short history of comparative negligence and fault. It
looks at the law in distinct periods, including before and after the
1978 amendments to the Comparative Fault Act. And, because
Minnesota’s comparative negligence statute was based on
Wisconsin’s, it also surveys early Wisconsin decisions dealing with
the problem of the nonparty. Part III takes a detailed look at the
Staab decisions. Part IV considers a variety of situations where the
issue of the fault of a nonparty may arise. Part V examines the
impact of the Staab decisions on joint and several liability and loss
reallocation. Part VI considers the impact of the decisions on
section 604.02, subdivision 3, which is the special loss reallocation
provision that applies to products liability cases where the parties
are in the chain of manufacture and distribution. Part VII considers
the impact of the Staab decisions on contribution claims by third
parties against employers. Part VIII is the conclusion.
II. A SHORT HISTORY
Before parsing the Staab decisions, a brief explanation of the
source of the problems the court faced in those cases will aid in
understanding the court’s analysis. Joint and several liability was the
19
traditional rule in Minnesota. It survived the adoption of the
comparative negligence statute and the amendments that turned
20
that statue into a broader Comparative Fault Act. Those
amendments are the source of the problem because of the
inconsistencies that they introduced into the Act.
The original comparative negligence statute read in part as
follows:
19.
20.

See Steenson, supra note 14, at 850–51.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2014 & Supp. 2015); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1969).
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Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in
the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person recovering. The court may, and when
requested by either party shall, direct the jury to find
separate special verdicts determining the amount of
damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to
each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of
such damages in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering. When there are two
or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to
awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of
negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that
each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole
21
award.
22
Minnesota’s statute was modeled after Wisconsin’s. The Bar
Committee comment to section 604.01 makes it clear that
Wisconsin law was thoroughly researched and that the Minnesota
statute was modeled largely upon Wisconsin’s comparative
23
negligence statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken the
position that adoption of the Wisconsin statute also included
interpretations of that statute by Wisconsin’s highest court, up to
24
the time of adoption by Minnesota.
The comparative negligence statute used the term “person” in
25
two places in subdivision 1. In the first sentence, the statute states
that contributory negligence does not bar the recovery of a
“person” as long as that person’s fault is not equal to or greater
21. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069. In Maday v. Yellow
Taxi Co., 311 N.W.2d 849, 850 (Minn. 1981), the court made it clear that joint and
several liability was incorporated in the comparative negligence act.
22. Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West, Westlaw through 2015), with
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2014 & Supp. 2015).
23. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 note (1969 Committee Comment) (“Supplied
by the Minnesota State Bar Association as a portion of the interpretive
memorandum of its Legislative Committee. . . . The Minnesota Comparative
Negligence Statute . . . is based on Wisconsin Law.”).
24. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977); Marier
v. Mem’l Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 244–45, 207 N.W.2d 706, 708 (1973).
25. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (1969).
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than the negligence of the “person” from whom recovery is
26
sought. In that context, it seems clear that “person” or “legal
representative” has to refer to someone who is a party to the
lawsuit. Only a “person” who is a party would be entitled to recover.
The last sentence, the joint and several liability provision,
stated that “[w]hen there are two or more persons who are jointly
liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the
percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however,
that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole
27
award.”
Again, the use of the word “person” in that context appears to
mean that a “person” is a party to the lawsuit. For consistency, the
term should be interpreted similarly when it appears in the same
subdivision. There is perhaps an ambiguity, however, because the
second sentence uses the term party:
The court may, and when requested by either party shall,
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts
determining the amount of damages and the percentage
of negligence attributable to each party; and the court
shall then reduce the amount of such damages in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
28
the person recovering.
In context, however, “party” and “person” appear to be
interchangeable. That argument can be made based upon the text
alone. Read that way, however, the statute has gaps that have to be
filled. Wisconsin’s experience with its comparative negligence
statute illustrates the problem, especially because Minnesota
borrowed Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute in 1969. It
also foreshadows the problems the Minnesota Supreme Court
would have to face in interpreting its own statutes.
A.

Short Detour to Wisconsin

Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute initially was quite
abbreviated:
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an
action by any person or the person’s legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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injury to person or property, if that negligence was not
greater than the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of
29
negligence attributed to the person recovering.
Prior to the adoption of Minnesota’s comparative negligence
statute in 1969, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that the
fault of certain entities had to be considered in allocating fault.
Because of the brevity of the Wisconsin comparative negligence
statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, out of necessity, had to plug
the gaps in the comparative negligence statute. In 1972, in Payne v.
30
31
Bilco Co., the court read its 1962 decision in Bielski v. Schulze as
adopting “the rule that the negligence of all joint tortfeasors must
32
be apportioned according to their degree of negligence.”
The Wisconsin comparative negligence statute did not provide
for contribution based on the percentage of negligence assigned to
co-tortfeasors. Historically, co-tortfeasors were liable on a pro rata
33
basis for purposes of contribution. The key issue in Bielski was
whether contribution would continue to be determined on a pro
rata basis or whether co-tortfeasors would be liable for their specific
34
percentages of negligence. The court opted for a revision of the
common law pro rata rule in favor of determining contribution
liability based on the percentages of negligence assigned to the
35
parties. In doing so, the court applied equitable principles, but
used the framework of the statute and Wisconsin’s special verdict
practice to expand the existing rule of equitable contribution to
36
contribution based on percentages of fault. The court explained:
If the doctrine is to do equity, there is no reason in logic
or in natural justice why the shares of common liability of
joint tortfeasors should not be translated into the
29. Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 242, 1931 Wis. Sess. Laws 375, 375–76 (codified
as amended at WIS. STAT. § 331.045 (1931)).
30. 195 N.W.2d 641, 645–46 (Wis. 1972).
31. 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962), overruled by Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294
N.W.2d 437, 447 (Wis. 1980) (“We conclude that permitting the award of punitive
damages in product liability cases is not inconsistent with Bielski and does not
undermine the law of comparative negligence.”).
32. Payne, 195 N.W.2d at 645–46.
33. See Bielski, 114 N.W.2d at 107–08.
34. See id. at 107.
35. Id. at 107–08.
36. Id. at 108–09.
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percentage of the causal negligence which contributed to
the injury. This is merely a refinement of the equitable
principle. It is difficult to justify, either on a layman’s
sense of justice or on natural justice, why a joint tortfeasor
who is 5% causally negligent should only recover 50% of
the amount he paid to the plaintiff from a co-tortfeasor
who is 95% causally negligent, and conversely why the
defendant who is found 5% causally negligent should be
required to pay 50% of the loss by way of reimbursement
37
to the co-tortfeasor who is 95% negligent.
38
In Pierringer v. Hoger, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
sanctioned piecemeal settlement of a tort claim. The court noted
that the percentage of negligence assigned to the non-settling
defendant “can only be determined by a proper allocation of all the
causal negligence, if any, of all the joint tortfeasors and of the
39
plaintiff if contributory negligence is involved.” The Pierringer
release severs joint and several liability, and makes the non-settling
defendants liable only for the percentage of negligence allocated to
40
them.
Wisconsin law, at the time of the adoption of Minnesota’s
comparative negligence statute, required consideration of the fault
of settling defendants and, even though the comparative
negligence statute did not provide for it, contribution according to
the percentages of negligence assigned to co-tortfeasors. Because of
the limited reach of the Wisconsin cases, it would be difficult to
conclude that Wisconsin intended for the fault of nonparties, other
than settling defendants, to be compared in the allocation of fault,
at least at the time of the adoption of Minnesota’s comparative
negligence statute.
B.

Return to Minnesota

The 1978 amendment to the comparative negligence statute
moved the joint and several liability sentence virtually verbatim to a
41
new section 604.02, subdivision 1. The only change was the

37. Id. at 109.
38. 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963).
39. Id. at 111–12.
40. Peter B. Knapp, Keeping the Pierringer Promise: Fair Settlements and Fair
Trials, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 26 (1994).
41. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (1978).
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substitution of the word “fault” for “negligence.” The 1978
amendment also added a new loss reallocation provision in new
section 604.02, subdivision 2, which provides that:
Upon motion made not later than one year after
judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether
all or part of a party’s equitable share of the obligation is
uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including
a claimant at fault, according to their respective
percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated
is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any
43
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
The loss reallocation provision, which was the first dent in the
law of joint and several liability in Minnesota, provides for
44
reallocation of a party’s equitable share of the obligation. The
language was taken verbatim from section 2(d) of the Uniform
45
Comparative Fault Act, which provided for the allocation of fault
46
only to parties to the litigation, not nonparties.
At the time the Uniform Comparative Fault Act’s loss
reallocation provision was adopted in Minnesota, there was nothing
to indicate how the Minnesota courts would handle the issue of
whether the fault of nonparties should be considered in the
allocation of fault in tort litigation. Later, in 1978, however, the
47
Minnesota Supreme Court decided Frey v. Snelgrove and Lines v.

42. Id.
43. Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 2.
44. Id.
45. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135 (2008).
46. Id. § 2 cmt. The comment explains:
The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other persons
who may have been at fault with regard to the particular injury but who
have not been joined as parties. This is a deliberate decision. It cannot
be told with certainty whether that person was actually at fault or what
amount of fault should be attributed to him, or whether he will ever be
sued, or whether the statute of limitations will run on him, etc. An
attempt to settle these matters in a suit to which he is not a party would
not be binding on him. Both plaintiff and defendants will have
significant incentive for joining available defendants who may be liable.
The more parties joined whose fault contributed to the injury, the
smaller the percentage of fault allocated to each of the other parties,
whether plaintiff or defendant.
Id.
47.

269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978).
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48

Ryan. Both cases were decided after April 15, 1978, the effective
49
date of the amendment. In Frey, the supreme court sanctioned the
50
use of the Pierringer release in Minnesota and outlined the
procedures for its use, stating as part of the procedure that the
fault of the parties, including settling defendants, should be
submitted to the jury:
In almost every case the trial court should submit to the
jury the fault of all parties, including the settling
defendants, even though they have been dismissed from
the lawsuit. If there is “evidence of conduct which, if
believed by the jury, would constitute negligence (or
fault) on the part of the person . . . inquired about,” the
fault or negligence of that party should be submitted to
51
the jury.
52
The court quoted Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee,
a 1975 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, in support of that
53
proposition. The issue in Connar was whether the negligence of an
employer should be considered in the allocation of negligence,
54
even though the employer was immune from liability.
55
Lines v. Ryan, decided a little more than three months after
Frey, arose out of a three-car accident in which a car driven by Jones
56
was hit by a car driven by Lines. Lines’ car was then hit by a car
57
driven by Ryan. Whether Lines hit Jones’ car before being hit by

48. 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978).
49. Id. at 896 (decided on November 24, 1978); Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 918
(decided on August 18, 1978).
50. For a deeper look at Pierringer releases, see Knapp, supra note 40 and
John E. Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in
Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977); see also supra notes 38–40 and
accompanying text. Pierringer releases sever joint and several liability as between
the settling defendant and nonsettling defendant(s). See Frey, 269 N.W.2d at
922–23 (citing Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963)). The fault of the
settling party has to be submitted to the trier of fact in part to establish the liability
of the nonsettling defendants. Id.
51. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923 (quoting Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of
Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975)).
52. Connar, 227 N.W.2d at 662.
53. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923.
54. Connar, 227 N.W.2d at 661.
55. Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 896 (Minn. 1978).
56. Id. at 899.
57. Id.
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58

Ryan’s car was in dispute. Because Lines was uninsured and not
gainfully employed, Jones made a claim for uninsured motorist
59
insurance benefits from her insurer, State Farm. Jones executed a
release and subrogation trust agreement with State Farm upon
60
receiving her insurance payment.
61
Lines brought suit against Ryan. State Farm subsequently
brought suit in Jones’ name against Lines pursuant to the release
62
and subrogation trust agreement. Ryan moved for consolidation
63
of the claims. During the trial, “Jones moved to amend her
64
complaint to add Ryan as a defendant in the Jones v. Lines action.”
65
That motion was granted. Ryan then “cross-claimed against Lines
66
for contribution and indemnity.”
The jury found Jones free from negligence and assigned 60%
67
of the fault to Lines and 40% to Ryan. Lines argued that the fault
of Jones should not have been submitted to the jury in the Lines v.
68
Ryan action. The supreme court followed Frey and relied again on
Connar for the proposition that the fault of all persons contributing
to the accident should be considered by the trier of fact in
69
allocating fault. Connar articulated the “principle” the Minnesota
Supreme Court found persuasive in Lines:
It is established without doubt that, when apportioning
negligence, a jury must have the opportunity to consider
the negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or
not they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they
can be liable to the plaintiff or to the other tort-feasors
70
either by operation of law or because of a prior release.
Connar could be read to stand for the broader proposition that
in all cases the fault of nonparties has to be taken into

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 900.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 902.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 902–03 (quoting Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, 227
N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975)).
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consideration, but at the time the case was decided the “principle”
71
was confined to released parties, the same as in Wisconsin. Connar
expanded the “principle” to justify consideration of the fault to the
immune employer.
As of Lines, then, one view is that the broadest proposition the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s cases had established is that the fault
of nonparties should be considered where a party is released
pursuant to a Pierringer release and where a person not joined
contributed to a single indivisible injury. Minnesota had already
taken the same position as Connar in Lambertson v. Cincinnati
72
Welding Corp., although, in Minnesota, unlike in Wisconsin, the
employer can be made a party to a lawsuit on a third-party
contribution claim and be held liable to the extent of its workers’
compensation liability or fair share of the judgment, whichever is
less.
The court broadened its approach to nonparties in Hosley v.
73
Armstrong Cork Co. Hosley involved the application of the
74
reallocation provision in section 604.02, subdivision 2 of the Act.
The issue was whether the reallocation statute applied in a case in
75
which the fault of nonparties was submitted to the trier of fact.

71. Lines, while relying on Connar, just as easily could have relied on its prior
decision in Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190
(1976). See generally Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 896. The minor plaintiff in that case
suffered a serious electrical shock and burns while trimming a tree in his backyard
under his father’s direction. Ferguson, 307 Minn. at 28–29, 239 N.W.2d at 191–92.
The trial court separated the case into distinct comparative negligence questions,
which asked the jury to first apportion fault between the minor plaintiff and
Northern States Power and then to Northern States Power and the plaintiff-father.
Id. at 31, 239 N.W.2d at 193. The jury found the minor plaintiff to be 75% at fault
and Northern States Power 25% at fault and, in the second set of apportionment
questions, found the plaintiff-father to be 70% at fault and Northern States Power
30% at fault. Id. The supreme court held that it was error to submit two separate
sets of questions apportioning fault because the fault should have been
apportioned among all three at fault parties in a single apportionment question.
Id. at 36, 239 N.W.2d at 196. The same rationale would presumably apply in Lines.
See generally Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 896.
72. 312 Minn. 114, 119–21, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977) (describing the
inequity arising from allowing contribution or indemnity to an employer already
under a workers compensation system). See infra Part VII for a more detailed
discussion.
73. 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986).
74. Id. at 293–94.
75. Id. at 292.
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The court held that it did not, because the equitable share of the
76
nonparties’ obligation was not proved to be uncollectible.
77
After
Hosley sued several asbestos manufacturers.
commencement of the suit, two of the defendants filed chapter 11
78
petitions for reorganization. The proceedings against those
79
defendants were automatically stayed. On Hosley’s motion, the
80
claims and cross-claims against those defendants were severed.
81
Hosley went to trial against the remaining defendants. The trial
court submitted the fault of nine parties to the jury, including
Hosley and Johns-Manville, two of the defendants who had filed
82
under chapter 11.
The court held that the loss reallocation provision applied to
Johns-Manville, the chapter 11 defendant that was severed from the
83
litigation. The court rejected the Uniform Comparative Fault
84
Act’s restrictive definition of “party” to mean a party to a lawsuit.
Rather, the court concluded that the definition “can be more
broadly defined as ‘a person whose fault has been submitted to the
85
jury,’ or, in other words, ‘parties to the transaction.’”
The court noted the comments to the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, which explain that the reason for excluding nonparties
to the lawsuit is because of the lack of certainty involved in
assigning fault to them, because any findings of fault would not be
binding on them, and because the plaintiff and defendant already
86
have sufficient incentives to join them as parties. But, the court
rejected these arguments, concluding simply that Lines resolved the
problem, even though Lines did not consider the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act in its opinion:
Under Lines, courts submit to the jury the fault of all
“parties to the transaction.” Because a percentage of fault
is assigned to such a party (Johns-Mansville in this case),
76. Id. at 294.
77. Id. at 290.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 293.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, cmt., 12 U.L.A. 39, 43
(Supp. 1985)).
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and because the percentage assigned represents the
maximum amount chargeable against such a party (the
figure can be used defensively by the party in a future
suit), Minnesota courts can calculate the reallocation of
this assigned fault pursuant to the statute. Thus, the
concerns expressed in the comment to the Uniform Act
87
have no applicability here.
Lines and Hosley establish the proposition that “person” for
purposes of subdivision 1 of section 604.01, and “party” for
purposes of the reallocation provision in subdivision 2 of section
604.02, mean “parties to the transaction,” rather than parties to the
88
lawsuit. Taken together, however, Lines, Frey, and Hosley could be
read as having a limited reach. The cases do not declare an open
season on submission of the fault of “parties to the transaction” if
89
they are not joined in the lawsuit. In each of the cases, the
“person” whose fault was submitted for apportionment was either
joined in the lawsuit and subsequently released or severed from the
90
lawsuit via settlement.
Those cases did not consider the joint and several liability
provision of subdivision 1 of section 604.02, however, and what
impact the allocation of fault to a nonparty would have on the joint
and several liability of a party to a lawsuit. There are two Minnesota
Supreme Court cases indicating that the Comparative Fault Act is
simply inapplicable in cases involving in a single defendant, even if
91
fault could be allocated to nonparties.
92
In Schneider v. Buckman, the supreme court held that the loss
reallocation statute in section 604.02, subdivision 2 did not apply in
a case in which there was only one defendant against whom

87. Id.
88. Id. at 293; Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 903 (Minn. 1978).
89. The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted the limitations in Ripka v. Mehus,
390 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), in which the defendant sought to include
a “phantom” person on the special verdict form. The court held that “a mere
allegation by the defendant that a phantom tortfeasor contributed to the accident
is insufficient evidence to justify submitting the alleged negligence of the phantom
tortfeasor to the jury for apportionment.” Id. at 881.
90. See Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986); Frey v.
Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978); Lines, 272 N.W at 896.
91. See Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 335 (Minn. 1990);
Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. 1988).
92. 433 N.W.2d at 103.
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judgment could be entered. The jury in the case had apportioned
35% of the fault to Buckman, the owner of an ambulance service,
for negligence in the transfer of Schneider to another hospital,
25% of the fault to Buckman’s daughter, and 20% each to the
94
transferring hospital and a physician at the hospital. Buckman’s
daughter was not a party to the suit because of defective service of
process, and the hospital and physician were not subject to liability
95
because Schneider’s suit against them was time-barred.
The parties assumed that section 604.02, subdivision 2
reallocation would apply, the plaintiff argued that the uncollectible
shares of the hospital and physician should be reallocated to
Buckman, and Buckman argued that there could be no
reallocation because Schneider did not follow the proper
96
procedures to establish reallocation. The supreme court held
“that the reallocation procedures . . . as interpreted in Hosley I, are
not implicated where, as here, there is but one defendant against
97
whom judgment can be or has been entered.” The court held that
the defendant was responsible for 100% of the plaintiff’s
98
damages.
99
In Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, a case involving a claim by the
plaintiffs against a city-owned liquor store that served alcoholic
beverages to an intoxicated motorcyclist who subsequently injured
the plaintiffs when their motorcycles collided, the jury apportioned
100
20% of the fault to the city and 80% to the motorcyclist. In a
footnote, the supreme court questioned whether joint and several
liability applied because the plaintiffs did not sue the motorcyclist
101
whose estate was brought in as a third-party defendant by the city.
The court did not question the application of section 604.02,
subdivision 1, however, because the parties proceeded on the
102
assumption that subdivision 1 did apply.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id.
453 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 330 n.3.
Id.
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In summary, the key supreme court cases construing the
Comparative Fault Act established that the fault of certain persons
who are not parties to a suit may be considered in the allocation of
fault, but also hinted at the conclusion that the joint and several
liability provisions of the Act are inoperable in cases where there is
a single defendant who is subject to liability to the plaintiff. It was
against this backdrop that the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
Staab I and Staab II.
III. THE STAAB DECISIONS
In Staab I, the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved the issue of
whether the fault of a nonparty could be used to effectively limit
the liability of the sole party to a lawsuit. The court framed the
issue as “whether the sole defendant, the Diocese of St. Cloud,
although found by the jury to be only 50% at fault, must pay 100%
of the $224,200.70 jury award because Staab elected not to join her
103
husband as a defendant.” An addendum, not the court’s, might
104
be, “. . . and where the Diocese chose not to join her husband.”
The court held that the Diocese was responsible for only its
105
percentage of fault. The open issue, however, was whether the
fault assigned to Mr. Staab could be reallocated to the Diocese, a
106
result suggested by Justice Meyer’s dissent in the case and the
position taken in two court of appeals decisions, including O’Brien
107
v. Dombeck and Staab I itself, in the second court of appeals
108
decision in the case. The supreme court resolved the lingering
question, left after its first decision, in the case of Staab II by
reversing the court of appeals and holding that the loss reallocation

103. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012).
104. The issue of whether a party to a suit could join a nonparty is an
important consideration in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of
Liability. According to the Restatement, consideration of the fault of certain
identified parties turns on the type of comparative fault adopted in a particular
jurisdiction. See id. intro., §§ A9–E19. In cases where there may be joint and several
liability, the fault of nonparties will generally not be considered, if a defendant has
the ability to join the nonparty. The burden is not placed on the plaintiff to do so.
See id. § A19 cmt. d (1998).
105. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 80.
106. Id. at 85.
107. 823 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
108. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 830 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013),
rev’d, Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 2014).
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provision could not be applied to increase the responsibility of a
109
severally liable party.
A.

Staab I

In Staab I, the court set out the basic rules for statutory
construction as a first step, noting the noncontroversial proposition
that the goal of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
110
“effectuate the intention of the legislature.” The court’s analysis
is somewhat complicated, but the key points in the decision are
that “‘several liability’ means ‘liability that is separate and
111
distinct’” from that of another, that several liability arises at the
time the tort is committed rather than at the time of judgment, and
that the legislature was presumed to know these special meanings
112
at the time of the 2003 amendment to the Comparative Fault Act.
The court’s first step was to determine whether the statutory
113
language was ambiguous.
Absent ambiguity, a court simply
114
If the language is
applies the plain statutory language.
ambiguous, the court looks beyond the language to determine
legislative intent, applying the relevant canons of statutory
115
construction.
Preliminarily, the court noted that the joint and several
liability statute is in derogation of the common law and, therefore,
116
has to be strictly construed. That means that the court will not
presume a legislative intent to modify the common law absent a
clear indication by the legislature. The court swept that canon aside
because it concluded that the clear legislative intent was to modify
117
the rule of joint and several liability. The court’s next step was to
“carefully examine the express wording of the statute to determine

109. Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 719.
110. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 72 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010)).
111. Id. at 73.
112. Id. at 73–77.
113. Id. at 72.
114. Id. at 73.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. Of course, finding an intent to modify the common law would not
necessarily mean that the statute should not be narrowly construed in determining
how far the rule of joint and several liability is modified. Following this conclusion,
however, the strict construction canon was not an impediment to the court in its
subsequent analysis.
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the nature and extent to which the statute modifies the common
118
law.”
In part two of its opinion, the court saw two “fundamental
challenges” that had to be resolved in order to ascertain the
119
meaning of subdivision 1 of section 604.02. The first was to
determine “the point in time [when] the statute . . . appli[es] to
120
determine whether ‘persons are severally liable.’” The second
concerned the meaning of the terms “severally liable” and “jointly
121
and severally liable.”
1.

When Does Several Liability Arise?

As to the first challenge, the court saw the timing of the several
liability determination as crucial to the issue of whether a sole
defendant is required to pay more than its equitable share of a
judgment as measured by a jury’s apportionment of fault. This is
the pivotal point in the court’s opinion:
The answer to the question of when liability is determined
for purposes of the statute directly impacts whether a sole
defendant in a lawsuit must pay more than its equitable
share of a judgment as measured by the percentage of
fault apportioned to it by the jury. Thus, in order to
interpret the statutory phrases “persons are severally
liable” and “persons are jointly and severally liable,” we
must examine when “persons are . . . liable” at common
law and determine whether the statute modifies the
122
common law rule.
The supreme court concluded that liability is created at the
123
instant [a] tort is committed.
Under Minnesota common law, “persons are . . . liable” at
the instant those persons’ acts cause injury to a victim.
Applying the common law, a tortfeasor’s liability exists
prior to and independent of any claim or civil action that
arises from that liability; hence, a judgment on a plaintiff’s

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 74–79.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 73 (quoting White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 371, 137 N.W.2d 674,
679 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d
362 (Minn. 1977)).
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cause of action in tort in a civil action enforces that liability
only against the defendant or defendants who are parties
to the civil action. Moreover, the language of section
604.02 provides no clear indication that it modifies the
common law rule regarding the time of creation of tort
liability. Subdivision 1 therefore cannot be read to
indicate that “persons are . . . liable” as a result of the
jury’s apportionment of fault because those “persons” are
124
already liable at the time the tort was committed.
White and the cases citing it do make that statement, but all
involved distinctly different questions than the one involved in
125
Staab. White arose out of a three-vehicle collision. A truck driven
by Johnson collided with a car driven by White, in which White’s
126
wife was a passenger. The White car collided with a car driven by
127
Three separate actions were commenced against
Urman.
Johnson, who served third-party complaints against the City of St.
Paul alleging negligence because of the way it maintained,
controlled, and operated the highway where the collision
128
occurred. Johnson provided written notice of the claim to the
129
City. He did not claim damages for injuries sustained by anyone
130
other than himself. The plaintiffs in the three cases did not file
131
notice of their claims with the City.
132
The cases were consolidated for trial. The City then moved
for summary judgment on the basis that none of the plaintiffs had
filed a notice of claim against the City, and that because the City
could not be held liable to the plaintiffs directly, it could not be
133
held liable in contribution or indemnity to Johnson. Putting
aside the indemnity claim, based on its conclusion that there were
sufficient facts to preclude summary judgment on that claim, the
court considered whether the general rule that lack of common
134
liability precludes a contribution claim applied to the case.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 73–74.
White, 272 Minn. at 365, 137 N.W.2d at 675.
Id. at 365, 137 N.W.2d at 676.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366–67, 137 N.W.2d at 676–77.
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The court distinguished the notice provision as a potential
impediment to common liability based on the nature of that
provision. While the statute requires a claimant to give notice to a
municipality of a claim, it “also destroys the municipality’s
common-law immunity from liability for negligence [claims]”
arising out of “the maintenance of . . . [the municipality’s] streets
135
and public grounds.” “Thus the statute concurrently creates a
duty upon the municipality to use due care and a right against the
municipality on the part of any person damaged because of a
breach of that duty. We have here, then, a right and a duty pre136
existing the injury.”
The court went on to say that the notice requirement “is a
condition precedent to bringing suit for the practical purpose of
quickly informing a municipality of injuries for which it might be
137
liable,” and that, while “[c]onceptually, the giving of notice is an
essential element of the cause of action, . . . realistically, because of
the preexisting right and duty, liability is created at the instant the
138
tort is committed.” What that means is that the city is “subject to a
139
liability.” There are other cases where subsequent limitations on
the plaintiff’s right to sue the defendant from whom contribution is
sought did not bar contribution claims, including cases where the
plaintiff and defendant have entered into a covenant not to sue or
140
where the plaintiff’s claim is barred by a statute of limitations.
The supreme court has consistently held that those subsequent
disabilities do not extinguish the common liability required for the
contribution claim, and the court has noted that other jurisdictions
141
take the same position. The reason, the court in White said, “is
that joint liability arises the moment the tort is committed and
these defenses come into being after the conduct which creates
142
that liability.”

135. Id. at 370, 137 N.W.2d at 679.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 370–71, 137 N.W.2d at 679.
139. Id. at 371, 137 N.W.2d at 679.
140. See Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 364, 51 N.W.2d 108, 112 (1952)
(statute of limitations); Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Omaha Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 309, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951) (covenant not to
sue).
141. White, 272 Minn. at 371, 137 N.W.2d at 679.
142. Id.

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

THE STAAB SAGA

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

1177

The court’s authority for that proposition was a 1953 note in
the Minnesota Law Review covering contribution and indemnity
143
among joint tortfeasors. In the course of discussing whether a
contribution claim can be asserted when the statute of limitations
has run in favor of one tortfeasor against the injured person, the
note made the following statement: “Common legal liability is
present since liability comes into existence at the instant the tort is
committed; thereafter, the right to recover contribution remains
inchoate until one of the tortfeasors discharges a disproportionate
144
share of the financial liability.” The supporting authority was a
145
1948 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Ainsworth v. Berg.
In discussing when the right of contribution arises, the court
in Ainsworth stated:
With respect to the equitable right to contribution arising
in automobile cases, it clearly has its origin in the joint
misconduct of the negligent parties at the time of the
accident. It remains an inchoate right until such time as
one of the joint tort-feasors pays more than his fair share
of the total damages resulting from such joint negligence,
at which time it ripens into a right to legal action to
146
recover therefor.
The Ainsworth court preceded the automobile case discussion
with an analysis of when liability of joint tortfeasors is established,
147
drawn from a 1933 Wisconsin case. Western Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Milwaukee General Construction Co. stated:
Some confusion seems to exist as to when joint tortfeasors are subject to a common liability. Logically, it
would appear that the right comes into being when the
combination of negligent acts gives force and direction to
events necessarily resulting in an occasion for paying
damages. This does not depend upon an action being
begun. A lawsuit may be necessary to settle the differences
arising between the parties, but it is not within the
province of a court as an original matter to give this right
143. Id. at 371 n.14, 137 N.W.2d at 679 n.14 (citing Note, Contribution and
Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REV. 470 (1953)).
144. Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN.
L. REV. 470, 480–81 (1953) (citing Ainsworth v. Berg, 34 N.W.2d 790 (Wis. 1948)).
145. Ainsworth, 34 N.W.2d 790.
146. Id. at 793.
147. Id. at 792 (citing W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 251
N.W. 491 (Wis. 1933)).

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

1178

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

[Vol. 42:1156

or to take it away. It has its inception at the time the
negligence of the alleged joint tort-feasors concurs to
bring the injuries to the third person. It springs up at the
time, and then and forever afterwards, until the claim is
outlawed, they or either of them are under a liability to
pay for injuries their negligent acts have caused. This
inchoate right ripens into a cause of action when one of
the joint tort-feasors pays more than his proportionate
148
share of the claim for which all are liable.
The important point in all of this is that the right of
149
contribution is inchoate. The contribution claim ripens upon
payment by a party of more than his or her fair share of a
150
judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Spitzack v.
151
152
Schumacher, which was cited by the court in Staab I, explains that
“common liability” exists from the moment a tort is committed and
that subsequent events, including the execution of a covenant not
to sue, the running of a statute of limitations, and the failure to
provide notice as required by a municipal tort claims act, do not
destroy the common liability necessary to sustain the contribution
claim:
Even though a joint tortfeasor may subsequently
acquire a particular defense against an injured party, that
tortfeasor may still be held liable to a cotortfeasor for
contribution. Thus, an injured party’s execution of a
covenant not to sue does not destroy the common liability
necessary to a cause of action for contribution. Similarly,
neither an injured party’s failure to bring an action
against a tortfeasor within the statute of limitations nor an
injured party’s failure to provide statutory notice of a
claim against a municipality relieves a tortfeasor of his
liability to a joint tortfeasor for contribution.
However, in all of these cases the defenses were
procedural in nature and did not go to the merits of the
case. The defenses of release, statute of limitations, and
lack of statutory notice do not deny liability, but rather
avoid liability. Thus, the underlying common liability was

148. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 251 N.W. at 492.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976).
152. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Minn. 2012). The court cited Spitzack for the
proposition that “joint liability is created at the instant the tort is committed.” Id.
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never extinguished and a joint tortfeasor’s right to
contribution was allowed.
The issue in the instant case is different. Respondents’
personal defense is not based on procedural defects which
allowed them to escape liability. Instead, a jury found on
the merits of the case that respondents were not as
negligent as decedent and therefore were not liable for
damages resulting from his death. Thus, at no time could
plaintiffs have recovered against respondents, and thus no
153
common liability could ever have existed.
Spitzack highlights the reason for taking the position that
common liability arises when the tort is committed. It provides a
rationale for refusing to allow “procedural” defenses to thwart a
contribution claim that in fairness should not be barred by those
154
defenses. That line of cases is simply inapposite to Staab I’s
assertion that several liability arises from the time the tort is
155
committed. The argument that several liability does not exist
unless there are two or more parties to a suit is not a “procedural”
156
defense.
While the Staab I court concluded that “persons are . . .
157
liable” at the instant that their acts cause injury to a victim, the
common law rule in White was interpreted by the court in Staab I to
mean that
a tortfeasor’s liability exists prior to and independent of
any claim or civil action that arises from that liability;
hence, a judgment on a plaintiff’s cause of action in tort
in a civil action enforces that liability only against the
defendant or defendants who are parties to the civil
158
action.
That seems obvious. A person cannot be bound by a judgment
in a lawsuit if the person is not a party to the litigation, but,
159
nonetheless, liability exists at the moment the tort is committed.

153. Spitzack, 308 Minn. at 145–46, 241 N.W.2d at 643 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
154. See id.
155. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 73.
156. Spitzack, 308 Minn. at 145–46, 241 N.W.2d at 643.
157. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 74.
158. Id. at 73–74.
159. See id. at 75 (citing Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Omaha Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 309–10, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951)).
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The paradox is that a party is “liable” for purposes of the allocation
160
of fault, but not really liable absent a judgment against it.
There is then a major step in the court’s reasoning that ties the
White concept to section 604.02, subdivision 1:
Moreover, the language of section 604.02 provides no
clear indication that it modifies the common law rule
regarding the time of creation of tort liability. Subdivision
1 therefore cannot be read to indicate that “persons are
. . . liable” as a result of the jury’s apportionment of fault
because those “persons” are already liable at the time the
161
tort was committed.
The reasoning of the Staab I court is wrapped tightly around
White, which is essential to the several holdings of the court in the
case.
The dissenting opinion in Staab I distinguished the cases cited
162
by the majority for the reasons noted in this analysis. The
majority responded in a footnote:
The dissent correctly observes that cases stating and
applying the rule regarding the time of creation of
common (i.e., joint and several) liability involved disputes
over contribution between jointly and severally liable
tortfeasors. This observation has no bearing, however, on
the validity of the rule that such liability arises at the time
of commission of the tort, or on our conclusion that
section 604.02, subdivision 1, incorporates and relies
upon that rule to determine “[w]hen two or more persons
163
are severally liable.”
2.

The Meaning of Several Liability and Joint and Several Liability

The second fundamental challenge noted by the court was to
determine the meaning of “several liability” and “joint and several
164
liability.” The court found Minnesota law in Black’s Law Dictionary:
Pursuant to Minnesota common law, “several liability”
means “[l]iability that is separate and distinct from
another’s liability, so that the plaintiff may bring a
separate action against one defendant without joining the

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 82.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 80–85.
Id. at 75 n.4.
Id.
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other liable parties.” Moreover, whether a person is
“[an]other liable part[y]” for the purposes of several
liability is a separate question from whether that person is
joined as a defendant in a plaintiff’s lawsuit. In contrast,
“joint liability” is “[l]iability shared by two or more
165
parties.”
The court noted that the difference between joint and several
liability is that defendants who are jointly and severally liable are
responsible for the entire award, but defendants who are severally
166
liable are only responsible for their equitable shares of the award.
Several liability has different meanings than the one noted in
Black’s Law Dictionary, however. The sense in which the supreme
court used the term “several liability” is consistent with section 11
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability,
establishing the effect of several liability: “When, under applicable
law, a person is severally liable to an injured person for an
indivisible injury, the injured person may recover only the severally
liable person’s comparative-responsibility share of the injured
167
person’s damages.”
The meaning of “several liability” has shifted, however, as the
Reporters’ Note on comment (a) explains:
Use of the term “several liability,” to describe the liability
of defendants who are only required to pay the plaintiff
their proportional share of the plaintiff’s damages is
imprecise and potentially confusing. Before the advent of
comparative responsibility, “several liability” was employed
to describe a defendant who was responsible for all of the
plaintiff’s damages but who could not be joined in a suit
with any other defendant who may also have been
responsible . . . “Several liability” was also employed when
damages could be apportioned among concurrent
tortfeasors based on their causal contribution to the
plaintiff’s injury, thereby rendering each defendant
“severally liable” for the portion of the plaintiff’s injury
168
caused by that defendant.
The pre-comparative fault concept of several liability differs
from the supreme court’s. Holding a severally liable party
165. Id. at 74 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997–98 (9th ed. 2009)).
166. Id.
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 11 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
168. Id. cmt. a Reporters’ note (citations omitted).
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responsible for the entire damages award to the plaintiff was the
usual understanding. Prosser, in the first edition of his treatise on
torts, said:
Quite apart from any question of vicarious liability or
joinder of defendants, the common law developed a
separate principle that a tortfeasor might be liable for the
entire loss sustained by the plaintiff, even though his act
concurred or combined with that of another wrongdoer
to produce the result—or, as the courts have put it, that
the defendant is liable for all consequences proximately
169
caused by his wrongful act.
The English understanding of the concept was the same:
Where more than one person is concerned in the
commission of a wrong, the person wronged has his
remedy against all or any one or more of them at his
choice. Every wrong-doer is liable for the whole damage,
and it does matter . . . whether the acted, as between
themselves, as equals, or one of them as agent or servant
170
of another(s).
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions are consistent with this
understanding of the meaning of several liability. In Gronquist v.
Olson, for example, the supreme court noted: “Liability in tort is
several as well as joint, and this is so, whether the tort-feasors act
separately or in conjunction. Each is responsible for the whole,
although the injured person may not have more than full
171
satisfaction except as punitive damages.”
By relying on Black’s Law Dictionary and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, the supreme court adopted a meaning of several
liability that deviated from its own precedent. In light of the court’s
previous analysis, use of the term in the cases would suggest that
the legislature would be presumptively aware of that meaning in

169. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1102 (1941).
170. P.A. LANDON, POLLOCK’S LAW OF TORTS 109 (14th ed. 1939).
171. 242 Minn. 119, 126, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954) (citation omitted); see
also Bartley v. Fritz, 205 Minn. 192, 196, 285 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1939) (“It is well
recognized that when an injury is caused by the concurrent negligence of several,
the negligence of each is deemed to be a proximate cause of the injury and each is
liable for the resultant damage”); Flaherty v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 328, 329, 40
N.W. 160, 160 (1888) (“If the collision was caused directly by the concurrent
negligence of both companies, both are responsible.”); Heartz v. Klinkhammer, 39
Minn. 488, 490, 40 N.W. 826, 827 (1888) (noting that joint trespassers are severally
liable).
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adopting the statute. That would be awkward, however, because
prior case law was not decided in the context of a statute that used
the familiar term, “several liability,” in a different setting. If the
legislature was charged with understanding a general common law
rule, that “liability” arises at the time a tort is committed, it could
also have been charged with knowledge that the common law rule
of several liability meant that a party would be liable for the entire
judgment to the plaintiff. The court sidestepped the issue by
172
rerouting Minnesota law through Black’s Law Dictionary.
In context, however, it seems clear that the legislative intent
was to adopt the Restatement meaning of the term, even if that was
not the settled meaning in the Minnesota cases. For the 2003
amendment to have its desired effect, the liability of persons had to
be limited to the persons’ percentage of fault, subject to the joint
and several liability exceptions.
3.

Cleanup

In the next part of its opinion the court interpreted three
173
additional words and phrases in section 604.02, subdivision 1.
174
The first was “person.” The statute states that where “two or more
persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in
175
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each.” The
176
issue was whether “person” means a party to the lawsuit. The
court discerned no legislative intent to so limit the term,
concluding that “a broad interpretation is consistent with the
common law principle that several liability is examined at the time
177
the tort is committed.” The court held that the word “persons”
178
includes both parties to the lawsuit and parties to the transaction.
While the connection between the issue of when liability arises (at
the time the tort is committed) and the definition of the term

172. See Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. 2012).
173. Id. at 75–77.
174. Id. at 75.
175. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (2014).
176. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 73–74.
177. Id. at 75 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“‘person’ as ‘[a] human being’ or ‘[a]n entity . . . that is recognized by law as
having most of the rights and duties of a human being”); AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1310 (4th ed. 2006) (recognizing the legal definition of “person” as
“[a] human or organization with legal rights and duties”)).
178. Id.

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

1184

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

[Vol. 42:1156
179

“person” is not readily apparent, the court’s opinion in Hosley,
180
which construed the term to include “parties to the transaction,”
justifies the result.
Hosley interpreted the loss reallocation provision in section
181
604.02, subdivision 2,
to support its position. That section
provides for the reallocation of a “party’s” uncollectible share of an
182
obligation. The court in Hosley concluded that the term “party”
includes “‘a person whose fault has been submitted to the jury,’ or,
183
in other words, ‘parties to the transaction.’” Following Hosley, the
court in Staab I concluded that the construction of the word
“‘party’ in subdivision 2 means all persons who are parties to the
tort, regardless of whether they are named in the lawsuit, it logically
follows that ‘persons’ in subdivision 1 must also mean all parties to
184
the tort.”
The second phrase in section 604.02 that the court construed
was that “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the
185
percentage of fault attributable to each.” Citing section 11 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, which
limits the right to recover against a severally liable person to only
the amount assigned to that person, the court construed the clause
to make a severally liable person liable only for the percentage of
186
fault assigned to that person. The court did not read the clause to
mean that contribution could be required from a person not a
party to the lawsuit because “[n]otably, the statute does not say,
‘When two or more persons are severally liable, each shall contribute
to the award in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to

179. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. 1986).
180. Id. at 293.
181. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2.
182. Id.
183. 383 N.W.2d at 293. Hosley was a suit against thirteen asbestos
manufacturers of asbestos products to which Hosley was exposed during his work
as an insulator. Id. at 290. After the suit was filed, two of the defendants in the
case, Johns-Manville and Unarco Industries, filed petitions for reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Id. That Act provides for an automatic stay. Id.
Accordingly, the Hennepin County District Court stayed the proceedings against
those two defendants. Id. Upon Hosley’s motion, the district court severed all the
claims that had been asserted against Johns-Manville and Unarco. Id.
184. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 76 (Minn. 2012).
185. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1.
186. Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 75–76.
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each.’” Again, the distinction is not immediately apparent. Even
had the legislature specifically stated that each severally liable
person shall contribute to the award in proportion to his or her
percentage of fault, it still would not obligate a nonparty to
contribute to the award, nor could it.
The dissent’s point was that, in order for the language to make
sense, two parties who are liable would have to make contributions
to awards. If there is only one party, the statute does not apply. It
takes at least two parties to have an apportionment of liability, and
at least two for the “contributions to awards” language to make
sense.
The court also rejected the argument made by the dissent that
the clause would be ineffective if a severally liable person not a
party to the lawsuit made no contribution. Instead, the court
concluded that “[t]he clause would be ineffective . . . if a severally
liable person were compelled to contribute out of proportion to his
188
or her percentage of fault.” Of course, not being a party to a
lawsuit, the nonparty would not be bound by the judgment.
189
The third word the court construed was “liability.” The
statute provides that “[w]hen two or more persons are severally
liable,” the “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the
190
percentage of fault attributable to each.” The word “liable” is
problematic because it suggests that fault may be apportioned only
to persons against whom a judgment has been rendered. The court
rejected that argument, however, again falling back on its previous
White analysis in which it concluded that liability exists at the time a
191
tort occurs, rather than at the time of judgment.
Sometimes statutory construction seems to require pounding
square pegs into round holes. That describes the process in Staab I.
The basic issue was whether the fault of a nonparty, who could have
been joined by either the plaintiff or the single defendant in the
suit, should be considered in the allocation of fault and, if so,
whether it would count in establishing the liability of the sole
192
defendant to the suit. As a general proposition, it seems clear that
after years of whittling away at joint and several liability, the
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 76.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (emphasis added).
Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 76.
Id. at 72.
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legislature adopted several liability as the default rule, and that the
meaning of several liability was that each party should be held
responsible for its fair share of a judgment.
The problem is that the statutory language seems to frustrate
that conclusion. The statute seems to contemplate that, in order to
make the several liability determination, the fault in a case has to
193
be assigned to “two or more persons” who “are severally liable.”
The statute states that “contributions to awards shall be in
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each
[person],” absent application of one of the four exceptions where
joint and several liability continues to apply, as in cases where a
194
person is more than 50% at fault.
The court avoided the problem by concluding that liability
exists independently of a tortfeasor’s participation in a lawsuit, and
it exists independently of any obligation to contribute to a
195
judgment. That takes care of the problem. Persons (including
nonparties) can be severally liable absent their joinder and absent
any judgment against them. It resolves the problem, but not
without bending precedent to support the conclusion.
Having dug deeply into Minnesota case law to find the answer
of when liability arises, the court then relied on Black’s Law
Dictionary to find the meaning of several liability, which means
proportionate liability, rather than digging deeply into Minnesota
case law to find the answer, which would have prompted a distinctly
different and inconvenient conclusion on the issue.
The main points of Staab I are:
1. Liability does not arise at the time of judgment. Rather,
it arises at the moment the tort is committed. That takes
care of the issue of whether a person has to be “liable”
196
for the statute to apply.
2. “Person” includes all parties to the transaction, so fault
can be assigned to anyone whose fault contributed to
the injury, even if that person is not a party to the
197
litigation.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 73.
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1).
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 76–77.
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3. “Liability” exists independently of a party’s participation
198
in a lawsuit.
So, there can be several liability (or joint and several liability)
even where the swing factor is the fault of a nonparty (who is really
a party to the transaction that led to the lawsuit) who is liable (even
though not a party to the suit, and even though there is no
judgment against that nonparty).
4.

An Alternative Construction?

After that detailed analysis, the court concluded that there is
an alternative interpretation of the statute, which is that the issue of
when two or more persons are severally liable is determined at the
199
200
time of the judgment. That was the dissent’s basic position. The
court painted the window shut on that interpretation, however, in
stating that “[t]he predicate to this proposed interpretation is that
the Legislature modified the common law rule that several liability
201
is created at the moment the tort is committed.” Of course,
starting with that proposition immediately dooms the alternative
construction.
The court noted the legislative intent to limit joint and several
liability through a string of amendments, continuously limiting its
reach.
In order to give effect to this intent, the statute must be
interpreted to apply in all circumstances in which a
person would otherwise be jointly and severally liable at
common law, and a person is liable at common law at the
moment the tort is committed, not as a result of a
judgment. This interpretation is consistent with the
common law and limits the application of joint and
several liability to those circumstances that are explicitly
202
specified in the statute.
Even if that concept is rejected, however, there is support for
the proposition that the fault of nonparties should be considered.
Viewed through the prism of the long history of legislative
amendments and judicial interpretations of the comparative

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
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203

negligence and fault statutes, the issue of whether the fault of
nonparties should be considered in the apportionment of fault
203. The long history of comparative fault in Minnesota has been one of
creative judicial solutions to a series of problems that were either not directly
addressed by the legislation or, if they were, in a way that left gaps between the
apparent legislative intent and the path the legislature took to effectuate that
intent.
In two of the cases, the supreme court construed the comparative negligence
statute to apply to claims that were not based on negligence. In Busch v. Busch
Construction, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 395 (Minn. 1977), the supreme court applied
the comparative negligence statute to claims for strict products liability, even
though the comparative negligence statute at the time was limited to the
comparison of negligence. Id. The court followed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
decision in Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (Wis. 1967), in which that court
applied its comparative negligence statute to strict liability claims. Busch, 262
N.W.2d at 393. The case was made easier because the court followed Marier v.
Memorial Rescue Service, Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 244–45, 207 N.W.2d 706, 708 (1973)
(requiring individual rather than aggregate comparisons of negligence), in which
the court held that an adoption of the comparative negligence statute presumed
adoption of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s interpretations of its comparative
negligence statute up to that point. Id.
Following Busch, the court in Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 733 (Minn.
1981), applied comparative fault principles to alcohol-related claims, one based on
a violation of the Civil Damage Act and one based on the then-permissible claim
for negligence arising out of the sale of 3.2 beer. Jones, 309 N.W.2d at 733. Jones,
who had been drinking at an American Legion and VFW bars, and also at a 3.2
tavern, was struck and killed by a car driven by Kortuem and owned by Gallagher.
Id. at 727. He was survived by his wife and two children. Id. His wife, as trustee,
brought a wrongful death action against the owner and driver of the car. Id. That
case settled. Id. Mrs. Jones and her two children then brought a dram shop suit
against the two bars and a common law action against Fisher, the 3.2 beer vendor,
an action that was at the time permitted under the supreme court’s decision in
Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973). Id. One of the issues on
appeal was whether Kortuem and Gallagher could assert a third-party claim for
contribution against either the dram shop defendants or the 3.2 beer seller. Id. at
728. The supreme court held that the contribution claim could be asserted against
both defendants. Id. at 733. To arrive at that result, the court had to permit the
assertion by Mrs. Jones and her two children for loss of means of support under
the 3.2 common law action, and then justify the right of contribution against two
defendants who were on theories other than negligence. Id. at 728. The dram
shop and 3.2 defendants argued that there was no common liability between them
and the wrongful death defendants, whose liability ran to Mr. Jones and not his
spouse. Id. at 729. The court rejected the argument, concluding that “[s]ince all
defendants are liable to decedent’s spouse either in her capacity as trustee or
individually, the common liability requirement is satisfied.” Id. The court
permitted allocation of fault based on comparative fault principles, even though
the Civil Damage Act at the time did not provide for the application of
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comparative fault principles to those claims. Id. at 731. The court recognized that
the case arose prior to the amendment of the Civil Damage Act requiring
allocation pursuant to the comparative negligence statute, but concluded “that it
is appropriate to apply comparative fault concepts in the same manner as we did
in [Busch].” Id. at 731.
In Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989), the supreme court was
faced with a conflict between subdivision 5 of section 604.01 of the Comparative
Fault Act and the mandate of a Pierringer release. Id. at 20. The nonsettling
defendant in the case wanted a pro tanto reduction of his damages by the amount
of the settlement between the plaintiff and the defendant, which subdivision 5
seemed to mandate, but the Pierringer release provided that the nonsettling
defendant would be held liable for the percentage of fault assigned to him by the
jury. Id. at 22–23. The court recognized that the acceptance of the Pierringer
release in Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978), occurred after the
adoption of the comparative negligence statute, but nonetheless read the statute
to exclude Pierringer releases:
We hold, therefore, that the term “payments” as used in [Minnesota
Statutes section 604.01, subdivision 5], with respect to Pierringer
settlements, refers only to payment for that portion of plaintiff’s
damages representing the settling defendant’s share of the liability.
The settlement payment does not extend to any further portion of
plaintiff’s award. In this case, only O’Neill’s 10 percent share of the
award is to be deducted from plaintiff’s award.
Id. at 23.
In the Lambertson v. Cincinnati Welding Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 124, 257 N.W.2d
679, 686 (1977) line of decisions, the supreme court used the comparative
negligence statute’s framework to solve one of the problems involved when it held
that employers could be subject to liability on contribution claims by third parties.
Id. While concluding that the comparative negligence and fault statutes did not
apply directly, the court used the statutory framework for purposes of
apportioning fault to the parties involved in the suit in order to establish the
extent of the employer’s contribution liability. Id. In Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc.,
326 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Minn. 1982), the supreme court held that “a third-party
tortfeasor may recover contribution from a negligent employer under the
principles of Lambertson and Johnson whether or not the employee, in a direct suit,
would have been barred from recovery under the comparative-fault statute.” Id. In
Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Minn. 1986), the supreme court applied
comparative fault principles in a case involving a claim for economic loss arising
out of negligent misrepresentation, even though the statute at the time covered
only claims for personal injury, death, or property damage. Id. The Comparative
Fault Act was later amended to catch up to Florenzano and include claims for
economic loss. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (Supp. 2015).
These decisions dealt with problems that were not directly addressed in the
comparative negligence and fault statutes. The problem of determining what
theories of recovery are subject to comparison, what damages claims, and how
employer liability should be treated illustrate adaptation of the statute to reach fair
results in the face of statutory deficiencies. Of course, another reading might
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becomes easy. The overriding goal of statutory interpretation is “to
204
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” The
specified factors in the basic canon suggest a holistic approach to
statutory construction, in attempting to determine the legislative
205
intent.
Given the fluidity of the statutory construction endeavor, there
are different roads to follow in cases where the legislature appears
to have a clear purpose in enacting a statute, but uses language that
actually frustrates realization of that purpose. The court’s solution
to the problem presented in Staab I seems to fit, but not without
some tap-dancing around definitional problems in the statute,
including the show-stopping use of the concept that liability arises
when a tort is committed, rather than when one is actually found
liable.
206
The consideration of the fault of nonparties in Hosley,
207
208
Lines, and Frey could be used as a platform for concluding that

simply be that the court ignored the statutory language to achieve an equitable
result in those cases, and that the deficiencies should have been a matter for the
legislature to correct.
At base, comparative fault raises numerous issues, not all of which a
legislature could have been expected to grasp in drafting a statute with such broad
implications in tort litigation. If the statute is viewed as a framework to be
judicially completed, the results may be justifiable.
204. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2014).
205. See id. Section 645.16 reads as follows:
The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every law shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation
are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.
When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the
legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) the mischief to be remedied;
(4) the object to be attained;
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or
similar subjects;
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and
(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.
Id.
206. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986).
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the fault of certain identified parties should be considered in the
allocation of fault. Imputed legislative awareness of those decisions
could readily lead to the conclusion that it knew that the fault of
nonparties would continue to be relevant in fault allocation, and
that to have an accurate headcount for purposes of fault allocation
the fault of nonparties would have to be considered, even if they
are not actually parties to the litigation.
Most importantly, in cases where there is ambiguity, construing
the statute in a way that harmonizes subdivisions 1 and 2 of section
604.02 is perhaps the strongest argument for considering the fault
of nonparties. The second Staab decision establishes the supporting
rationale.
B.

Staab II
209

In Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab II), the Minnesota
Supreme Court resolved the lingering question left after its first
decision in the case when it held that the fault allocated to the
nonparty could not be reallocated to the only at-fault party in the
lawsuit.
Section 604.02, subdivision 2 of the Comparative Fault Act
provides for reallocation in certain cases where a share of an
obligation is uncollectible:
Upon motion made not later than one year after
judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether
all or part of a party’s equitable share of the obligation is
uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including
a claimant at fault, according to their respective
percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated
is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any
210
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
Any party may move for reallocation where “all or part of a
211
party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible . . . .”
The uncollectible share must be reallocated to the remaining
212
parties “according to their respective percentages of fault.”
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978).
Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978).
853 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 2014).
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2.
Id.
Id.
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To illustrate the typical operation of the statute, assume that a
plaintiff brings suit against two defendants (D1 and D2), that both
defendants are found to be liable to the plaintiff, and that the
plaintiff is found to be contributorily negligent. Assume that the
jury apportions 20% of the fault to the plaintiff, 20% to D1, 60% to
D2, and sets the damages at $100,000. Also assume that D1 is
unable to pay its fair share of the judgment. D2, whose fault is
greater than 50%, is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff and
would be required to pay the plaintiff 80% of the plaintiff’s
damages ($100,000, less plaintiff’s 20%). D2 would seek to
reallocate D1’s uncollectible share of the damages ($20,000), in
part to the plaintiff. Because D2’s equitable share of the obligation
has to be reallocated to the plaintiff and D2 according to their
respective percentages of fault, the plaintiff would absorb onefourth (20/80) of the uncollectible amount ($5,000) and D2 threefourths (60/80) of the uncollectible amount ($15,000). Both
parties would have continuing contribution claims against D2.
Staab II involved a different situation for two reasons. There
213
was only one defendant who was a party to the suit. The plaintiff’s
husband was not a party, but Staab I requires allocation of fault to
parties to the transaction, so even though the husband’s chair was
empty, fault had to be allocated to him when the jury found him to
214
be causally negligent in causing his wife’s injuries. The second
difference from the hypothetical is that the only defendant in the
suit, the Diocese of St. Cloud, was found to be 50% at fault and was,
215
therefore, not jointly and severally liable.
That means that the reallocation statute has to be read against
section 604.02, subdivision 1, which makes several liability the
default rule, subject to limited exceptions where a defendant or
defendants will be jointly and severally liable. In Staab I, the
Diocese could not be jointly and severally liable because its fault
was not greater than 50% and none of the other exceptions
216
applied.
As the court noted in Staab II, there are two potential
constructions of the loss reallocation provision. One interpretation,
reconciling the loss reallocation rule with the default rule of several
liability, would not allow the loss reallocation rule to override the
213.
214.
215.
216.

Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 715.
Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 80.
Id.
Id.
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default rule of several liability in subdivision 1 of section 604.02.
218
The other would, based on the text of the reallocation provision.
That was the subject of the disagreement between the majority and
dissenting opinions in Staab II. The essential problem in construing
the statute is in finding breathing room for the loss reallocation
provision when the rule of joint and several liability is no longer the
default rule, as it was when the loss reallocation provision was
219
added to the Comparative Fault Act in 1978. When all defendants
found to be at fault were jointly and severally liable, the new loss
reallocation rule, which included any at-fault plaintiff in the
reallocation equation if a defendant (or defendants) was unable to
pay its fair share of the judgment, was a middle position between
full retention of the rule of joint and several liability and a rule of
pure several liability.
The erosion of the rule of joint and several liability continued
when the legislature adopted percentage cutoffs that made certain
220
defendants liable for only a certain multiple of their fair shares,
but the statute at issue in Staab II was the 2003 amendment, which
221
clearly made several liability the default rule.
Again, the court began its analysis of the statute with the basic
proposition that “[t]he goal of statutory interpretation is to
222
effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” “If the Legislature’s
intent is clear from the unambiguous language of the statute,” the
223
court applies “the statute according to its plain meaning.” Judicial

217. Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 722.
218. Id. at 725–26 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 719.
220. Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, Two or More Defendants (Joint and
Several Liability, Several Liability, or Independent Liability), in 4 MINN. PRAC. SERIES,
CIVJIG no. 15.15 (6th ed. 2015) (“The common law rule of joint and several
liability was modified several times by the legislature through the adoption of a
loss reallocation rule and cutoffs limiting the liability of defendants whose fault fell
below a certain percentage of fault.”).
221. Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 718–19 (“The current text of subdivision 1 was
enacted in 2003. . . . By adopting this amendment, the Legislature ‘inten[ded] to
limit joint and several liability to the four circumstances enumerated in the
exception clause, and to apply the rule of several liability in all other
circumstances.’” (citing Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 78 (Minn. 2012))).
222. Id. at 716. Supporting its proposition, the court first cited Brayton v.
Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010), and then referenced Minnesota
Statutes section 645.16. Id.
223. Id. at 716–17 (citing State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013)).
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constructions of a statute become an integral part of the statute,
“[b]ut if [the] statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the statute is ambiguous,” and the court will look to
225
“other factors to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.”
The court determined that permitting reallocation to a
severally liable party under section 604.02, subdivision 1 would
226
violate two canons of statutory construction. First, it “would
violate the principle that a statute must be construed in a manner
227
that gives effect to each of its provisions.” Increasing the liability
of a severally liable party via reallocation would render ineffective
the language in section 604.01, subdivision 1, stating that
contributions to awards should be made in proportion to the
percentage of fault assigned to that defendant (absent a finding of
joint and several liability under one of the statutory exceptions in
228
subdivision 1). Second, it “would be inconsistent with [another]
canon of statutory construction ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’—
229
the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”
Permitting reallocation would result in an interpretation of
subdivision 2 that would in effect create a fifth exception to the
230
rule of several liability.
The court also concluded that the legislative history of the
231
2003 amendment supported its conclusion. The original purpose
of the loss reallocation provision was to allow a jointly and severally
liable party to shift part of the loss, due to the uncollectibility of a
party who was unable to pay his or her fair share of a judgment, to

224. Id. at 717 (“Judicial construction of a statute becomes part of the statute
as though it were written therein.” (citing Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone,
Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012))).
225. Id. (citing Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn.
2006)).
226. Id. at 718.
227. Id.
228. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (“When two or more persons are severally
liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault
attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally
liable for the whole award . . . .”).
229. Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 718 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 719 (“The fact that one liable party is insolvent or cannot be
collected from for other reasons is not one of the four exceptions in subdivision 1
to which joint and several liability still applies. Yet that would be the practical
effect of permitting reallocation to severally liable parties under subdivision 2.”).
231. Id. at 718–21.
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other parties, including the plaintiff. The legislature has been
consistent in moving toward greater restrictions of the rule of joint
and several liability since 1978, while the loss reallocation rule has
233
remained unchanged. The adoption of the rule of several liability
as the default rule effectively limited the role of the loss
234
reallocation provision.
Putting together the canons of statutory construction, the
legislative history, and the purpose of section 604.02, subdivision 2,
the court held “that under [section 604.02, subdivision 2], an
uncollectible portion of a party’s equitable share of damages
cannot be reallocated to a party that is only severally liable under
235
[subdivision 1].”
The result is reminiscent of John Simonett’s observation that
“everyone knows a statute does not mean what it says until a court
236
says it means what it says.” We now know that several liability
means several liability and that the fault of non-parties may be
considered in the allocation of fault. The issue is whose fault
should be included in the allocation question.
IV. WHOSE FAULT IS APPORTIONED?
The Minnesota cases establish that the fault of certain
nonparties may be considered in the allocation of fault. The
Minnesota cases are devoid of any policy analysis on the issue of
why the fault of nonparties should be considered and under what
circumstances. Only by implication, considering the court’s
237
238
239
reference to Connar in Frey and Lines, is there a suggestion
that the fault of all persons who contributed to the accident must
232. Id. (“[W]hen subdivision 2 was enacted, it was a mechanism to limit the
amount of damages that a jointly liable defendant could be required to pay. . . .
[A] jointly liable defendant could petition the district court to reallocate an
uncollectible portion of damages among all potentially liable parties, including
the plaintiff.” (citing Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liability Minnesota Style,
15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 969, 976 (1989))).
233. Id. at 720.
234. See infra Part V.
235. Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 721.
236. John E. Simonett, The Footnote as Excursion and Diversion, 55 A.B.A. J. 1141,
1141 (1969).
237. Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis.
1975).
238. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978).
239. Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 902–03 (Minn. 1978).
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be submitted to the trier of fact in order to achieve a fair
apportionment of fault.
A.

The Policy of Including Nonparties in the Allocation of Fault

Whether or not to include nonparties in the allocation of fault
is a question of fairness, but fairness is a relative and nuanced
concept. From the plaintiff’s perspective, fairness might dictate
apportioning fault only to parties to the suit. With Minnesota’s
comparative fault allocation rules, the plaintiff is already at a
disadvantage because of individual comparisons of fault, and if a
defendant is concerned that there are other potentially responsible
persons, the defendant can join those persons in the litigation. On
the other hand, there may be cases where a nonparty is not subject
to suit. That will occur in a variety of cases, including, for example,
cases where a person or entity is immune from liability, or where a
240
statute of limitations has run.

240. The issue of whether and under what circumstances the fault of a
nonparty should be considered has been the subject of numerous articles. See
generally David C. Anderson & Monika L. Sullivan, Ten Tips for Navigating
Michigan’s Notice of Nonparty at Fault Requirements, 90 MICH. B.J. 22 (2011); William
D. Cleaveland, The Empty Chair Game: Is the Price More Than We Should Pay?, ARIZ.
ATT’Y, Jan. 1997, at 16; Brian P. Dunigan & Jerry J. Phillips, Comparative Fault in
Tennessee: Where Are We Going, and Why Are We in This Handbasket?, 67 TENN. L. REV.
765 (2000); Neal F. Eggeson, The Return of the Anonymous Nonparty: Why Hasn’t
Anyone Noticed?, RES GESTAE, June 2006, at 11; Mark M. Hager, What’s (Not!) in a
Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on Liability Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 77
(2000); Nancy C. Marcusal, Phantom Parties and Other Practical Problems with the
Attempted Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60 ARK. L. REV. 437 (2007); Joshua D.
Shaw, Limited Joint and Several Liability Under Section 15-38-15: Application of the Rule
and the Special Problem Posed by Nonparty Fault, 58 S.C. L. REV. 627 (2007); Mark
Siegel & H. Michael Wright, The Nonparty at Fault Defense, the Squirrel, the Phantom
and Everybody Else But Me, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 1992, at 23; David C. Sobelsohn,
Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413, 445–57 (1985); Stephen B. White & David J.
Abney, Phantom Nonparties at Fault, Problems in Apportioning Degrees of Fault, ARIZ.
ATT’Y, June 1992, at 15; Joseph Bean, Comment, Torts—Carroll v. Whitney: The
Tennessee Supreme Court Permits Juries to Allocate Fault to Immune Nonparties in
Negligence Actions, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 179 (2001); Jonathan Cardi, Note,
Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument Based on Comparative
Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1293
(1997); Nancy A. Costello, Note, Allocating Fault to the Empty Chair: Tort Reform or
Deform?, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 571 (1999); Daniel Levi, Note, A Comparison of
Comparative Negligence Statutes: Jury Allocation of Fault—Do Defendants Risk Paying for
the Fault of Nonparty Tortfeasors?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 407 (1998).
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The uniform acts covering comparative fault and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability take
different positions on the issue, based on varying views of the
underlying policies.
241
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act,
and the Uniform
242
Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act which replaced it,
limited the allocation of fault to parties to the lawsuit with the
exception of settling parties. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act is
243
a pure comparative fault act. The Uniform Apportionment of
Tort Responsibility Act is a modified comparative fault act with
244
aggregate comparisons of fault. A plaintiff would be barred from
recovery only if the plaintiff’s fault is equal to or greater than the
245
aggregate fault of the defendants.
The Act imposes several
246
liability with limited exceptions for joint and several liability. It
also provides for reallocation of amounts uncollectible from a
severally liable party to all other parties, including the plaintiff and
247
any settling parties.
A preliminary draft of the Uniform Apportionment of Tort
Responsibility Act provided for the consideration of a “nonparty at
fault,” but that position was rejected because of the inherent
problems involved in determining whose fault would be
considered:
First, who is it that should qualify as a “nonparty at fault”?
Anyone over whom the court lacks jurisdiction? Or, does
it matter that jurisdiction is lacking because the person is,
for example, a foreign diplomat or an immune
governmental or other entity, as compared to someone
upon whom service cannot be perfected because the
person is out of the country or whose location is
unknown? Second, to qualify as a “nonparty at fault”, does
the person have to be identifiable and, if so, in what
manner or particulars? Third, it was also thought that the
absence, and nonparticipation, of such a person tended
to skew the trial process unfairly. Finally, it was noted that
241.
242.
(2008).
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 142 (2008).
UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 14
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135–36.
UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 3(b), 12 U.L.A. 14.
Id.
Id. § 6(a).
Id. § 5.
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a defendant always has the right to seek contribution from
any legally responsible person whose fault also
contributed to the claimant’s injury or harm and that this
right, in most cases, will permit a defendant to join
someone who was not already a defendant. If joinder is
not possible, a defendant who is held responsible may
subsequently pursue an absent tortfeasor in a separate
248
action.
Those problems led to a limitation of the fault to only the
parties to the litigation. A party is someone who has been sued and
is a party to the lawsuit, not “someone who merely was involved in
249
the accident that led to the lawsuit.”
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
takes a different position on whose fault is subject to allocation,
250
depending on the type of comparative fault involved. Given the
variations in state comparative negligence and fault statutes, stating
a single rule for the allocation of fault applicable to all of those
variations would be difficult. Instead, the Restatement breaks down
the standards for the allocation of fault according to comparative
251
fault type. The Restatement includes a range of “tracks,” from
pure joint and several liability, to joint and several liability with loss
reallocation, to hybrid liability based on a threshold percentage of
comparative fault, to hybrid liability based on the type of
252
damages. No matter what type of comparative fault track is
considered, however, there is an exception for persons engaged in
253
concerted action.
To understand how the Restatement works, it is helpful to
delineate the persons whose fault is potentially subject to
consideration before pointing out how each is treated under the

248. Id. note (2003).
249. Id.
250. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.
(AM LAW INST. 2000).
251. Id. §§ 12–15.
252. Id. §§ D18 cmt. D, A18, C21, D19.
253. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability section 15
states “[w]hen persons are liable because they acted in concert, all persons are
jointly and severally liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to
each person engaged in concerted activity.” Id. § 15. Comment a notes that “joint
and several liability for persons engaged in concerted action applies regardless of
the rule regarding joint and several or several liability for independent negligent
tortfeasors in the jurisdiction.” Id. § 15, cmt. a.

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

THE STAAB SAGA

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

1199

varied tracks. The key terms are “party,” “identified person,”
“immune person,” and “settling tortfeasor.”
“Party” means “those who have been joined as a party in the
lawsuit,” including “plaintiffs, defendants, third-party defendants,
254
intervenors, and other named parties.” An “identified person” is
“a person who has been sufficiently identified to permit service of
255
process or discovery from that person.” A “settling tortfeasor” is
defined as “a potentially liable tortfeasor who is released from
256
liability to the plaintiff by the settlement.”
“Immune persons” is a broad grouping that includes persons
who are not liable because a statute of limitations has run, persons
whose liability is limited because of a damages cap, and
257
governmental entities who are immune from liability. In the
latter case the Restatement excludes from consideration the fault
of governmental entities where the immunity is a proxy for a no258
duty conclusion.
Where the rule of joint and several liability applies, only the
fault of “parties” and “settling tortfeasors” is submitted to the trier
259
of fact. The rationale is that the burden of identifying and suing
other liable parties should be on those who are jointly and severally
260
liable. The fault of other nonparties is not submitted to the
261
factfinder.
Defendants usually can join nonparties, and the
plaintiff may sue all potentially liable persons, but the plaintiff is
262
not required to do so.
In pure several liability jurisdictions, on the other hand, the
Restatement rule provides for consideration of a broader grouping
of persons in the allocation of fault, including parties, settling
263
tortfeasors, and identified persons. The rationale is that because
a severally liable defendant’s liability is limited to its percentage of
fault, the burden of joining additional parties shifts to the
264
plaintiff.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. § A19 cmt. b.
Id. § B19 cmt. b.
Id. § 24 cmt. c.
Id. § B19 cmt. e.
Id.
Id. § A19 cmt. d.
Id. § A19 cmt. d.
Id.
Id.
Id. § B19.
Id. § B19 cmt. d.
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A third track covers cases where joint and several liability is
coupled with loss reallocation. In cases where a judgment of
contribution cannot be fully collected from another defendant, the
uncollectible portion of the damages is reallocated to all other
parties, including the plaintiff, in proportion to the percentages of
265
fault assigned to the other parties. The rule requires allocation of
fault to parties, which covers only “those who have been joined as a
266
party in the lawsuit.” It includes “plaintiffs, defendants, third267
party defendants, intervenors, and other named parties.” It also
includes settling tortfeasors and employers where the employer is
subject to liability on a contribution claim or where the employer’s
268
comparative responsibility reduces the plaintiff’s damages. The
269
rule does not permit the assignment of fault to immune persons.
The rationale is that
[o]mitting immune persons does not place the financial
burden of the immune person’s legal responsibility
necessarily on either plaintiffs or defendants. Comparative
responsibility that would have been assigned to an
immune person will necessarily (since the factfinder must
still distribute 100 percent of responsibility) be
apportioned among the remaining parties in the case.
The immune nonparty’s share of comparative
responsibility may not be assigned to (and borne by) the
parties in the same proportion as would have occurred if
the factfinder assigned comparative responsibility to the
immune person and that share were then reallocated
270
....
The omission of immune persons from consideration could
result in an increase of the plaintiff’s percentage of fault and, in a
modified comparative fault jurisdiction, bar the plaintiff from
recovery; however, the Restatement notes that omission of immune
271
persons from consideration will not avoid that impact.
Yet another track applies to cases where there may be both
joint and severally liable defendants and severally liable defendants.
In cases where it is clear that the parties to a suit may be only jointly
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. § C21.
Id. § C19 cmt. c.
Id.
Id. § C20.
Id. § C19 cmt. e.
Id.
Id.
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and severally liable, the same rules apply as under the pure joint
272
and several liability rule. Because it will not be generally known
whether a party, or parties, will be severally liable only, the same
rules for the treatment of immune persons apply as in the pure
several liability cases where one or more defendants are severally
273
liable.
274
Minnesota’s Comparative Fault Act is an amalgam of three of
the Restatement tracks. It has a system with a default rule of several
liability, but with limited joint and several liability exceptions, one
of which imposes joint and several liability on a party whose fault is
275
greater than 50%. It also has a loss reallocation provision, which
is still viable, in addition to a special loss reallocation provision that
276
applies in certain products liability cases.
The relevant Restatement tracks could justify differing results
as applied to Minnesota. The default rule of several liability
suggests consideration of nonparties, including identified persons,
which would include certain immune persons. Even with the joint
and several liability exception and a loss reallocation rule, the
possibility that any party to a suit may be held only severally liable
points as a matter of policy toward a broader inclusion of identified
persons, beyond parties to the suit. While there is a possibility that
parties could be jointly and severally liable, that will ordinarily not
be determinable in advance of litigation. And, while a defendant
may have the ability to join a nonparty, that will not be the case if
the nonparty is immune from liability, which leads back to the basic
position on several liability. That policy is to include identified
persons, including certain immune persons, in the allocation of
fault.
That policy is disputable, of course. Several liability is intended
277
to achieve fair treatment of tortfeasors, but it does so at the
expense of injured persons whose chances for a full recovery are
278
diminished by the consideration of the fault of multiple persons.

272. See id. § D19(b).
273. Id. § D19(b) cmt. h.
274. MINN. STAT. § 604.01.
275. Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(1).
276. Id. § 604.02, subdivs. 2–3.
277. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. §§ B19
cmt. d, D19 cmt. j.
278. Hager, supra note 240, at 104. Professor Hager notes Professor Wright’s
characterization of the result as a “tortfest” in which “[t]he more defendants there
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There is also the concern, expressed in the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, that ensuring full litigation of tortfeasors’ fault justifies
279
limiting the allocation of fault to those who are parties to the suit.
Minnesota’s rule as of 1978 was joint and several liability with
loss reallocation. The Restatement track on joint and several
liability permits consideration of the fault of only parties to the
litigation, along with the fault of settling defendants and employers
280
who are subject to liability on contribution claims. It would not
permit consideration of the fault of identified persons, including
persons immune from liability. Minnesota cases certainly suggested
a more expansive rule than the Restatement’s, however, even
before the 2003 amendment. In Staab I, the Minnesota Supreme
Court carried the rule forward in considering the fault of a
nonparty in its interpretation of the 2003 amendment. Minnesota’s
position is consistent with the Restatement track on pure several
liability, but at this point the Restatement position is broader
simply because the Minnesota courts have not had occasion to
consider some of the nonparties who are included in the
Restatement’s apportionment of fault.
B.

Fault Allocation in Minnesota

The Restatement tracks permitting the consideration of the
fault of nonparties in several liability cases includes “identified
281
persons,” which includes a variety of persons who are not parties
to the litigation. This section breaks down in more detail the
persons whose fault might potentially be subject to comparison
under Minnesota law.
Under current Minnesota law, the fault of a nonparty may be
submitted in cases involving a party who is dismissed from litigation
pursuant to a Pierringer release, where a party is identified and not
joined (including the Staab facts), and where a party is dismissed
because of bankruptcy proceedings (Hosley). There are other cases
were, or the worse they behaved, the less individual responsibility each defendant
would bear for the injury, even though her tortious behavior remained constant
and was an actual and proximate cause of the entire injury.” Id. at 103; Richard W.
Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 45,
59 (1992).
279. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 125 (2008).
280. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19
cmt. c.
281. Id. § B19 cmt. b.
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yet to be resolved, including where a statute of limitations has run
on a claim against a person, where a person is not subject to
jurisdiction in Minnesota, or where a person or entity is immune
from liability.
1.

Parties Released Pursuant to Settlement
282

In Frey v. Snelgrove, the supreme court followed Wisconsin law
in holding that the fault of defendants who have entered into a
Pierringer release should, in almost every case, be submitted to the
283
jury. The court said that “[i]f there is ‘evidence of conduct which,
if believed by the jury, would constitute negligence (or fault) on
the part of the person . . . inquired about,’ the fault or negligence
284
of that party should be submitted to the jury.”
If a Pierringer release is executed, any possibility of joint and
several liability between the settling and nonsettling defendants is
285
severed. The remaining parties are held liable only for their
286
percentages of fault. Of course, the nonsettling defendants could
be held jointly and severally liable for their combined percentages
of fault, assuming that one of the statutory exceptions is applicable.
2.

Identified Persons

The term “identified person” in the Restatement includes a
variety of persons whose fault will be included in the
287
apportionment of fault. The term is used more narrowly here to
include persons whose identity is known, but who are not joined in
the litigation for reasons other than that they are not subject to
jurisdiction or are otherwise immune from liability.
288
In Lines v. Ryan, a three-car chain collision gave rise to two
289
lawsuits. Jones, who was driving the first car, was hit by Lines, who
290
was driving the second car. Lines was in turn hit by a third car
282. 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978).
283. Id. at 923. The court followed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in
Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975).
284. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923 (quoting Connar, 227 N.W.2d at 662).
285. Id. at 922.
286. Id.
287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19
cmt. b.
288. Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978).
289. Id. at 899.
290. Id.

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

1204

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

[Vol. 42:1156

driven by Ryan, causing Lines to hit Jones a second time or, if Lines
291
were believed, for the first time after Ryan hit him. Lines brought
292
suit against Ryan. Because Lines was uninsured, Jones made a
claim against State Farm, her uninsured motorist insurer, and
293
settled the claim pursuant to a subrogation and trust agreement.
294
State Farm then brought suit against Lines in Jones’ name. The
trial court consolidated the cases and submitted the fault of all
three drivers to the jury, which found Lines to be 60% negligent
295
and Ryan 40% negligent. Lines argued that Jones’ negligence
should not have been submitted to the jury in Lines’ claim against
296
Ryan. Again, following the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision
297
in Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly submitted the
fault of Jones to the jury, even though Jones was not a party to the
298
Lines-Ryan litigation.
In Ripka v. Mehus, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered
a case involving an automobile accident in which the defendant
claimed that the accident was due at least in part to the fault of a
299
construction worker who waved her through a construction area.
The defendant requested that the trial court submit the fault of the
300
unidentified construction worker to the jury. The trial court
301
denied the request. The jury found the plaintiff 17% negligent
302
and the defendant 83% negligent. The court of appeals held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit the
303
fault of what it called a “phantom tortfeasor” to the jury.
The court distinguished Lines, Frey, and Connar on the facts
because the persons whose fault was submitted in those cases were
304
identified.
The court of appeals concluded that “a mere
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id. at 902.
227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975).
Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 902–03.
390 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881.
Id.
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allegation by the defendant that a phantom tortfeasor contributed
to the accident is insufficient evidence to justify submitting the
alleged negligence of the phantom tortfeasor to the jury for
305
apportionment.”
The court’s approach is consistent with the position taken in
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability in
cases where the fault of identified parties may be submitted to the
factfinder:
A nonparty who is not sufficiently identified to be either
subject to service of process or discovery ordinarily should
not be submitted to the factfinder for assignment of
responsibility. Before assigning responsibility to
nonparties, they should be sufficiently identified that they
could be joined in the suit (regardless of whether
personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction would
306
exist) or that discovery could be obtained from them.
The Restatement takes the position that fairness may require
an exception to the rule in some cases:
Thus, for example, if the plaintiff attempts to mitigate her
comparative responsibility by claiming that an
unidentified person created an emergency that required
the plaintiff to respond suddenly, a defendant who could
not reasonably identify the person nevertheless should be
permitted to have the nonparty submitted for an
307
assignment of comparative responsibility.
3.

Persons Against Whom a Statute of Limitations or Repose Has
Run

A person may not be subject to liability because a statute of
308
309
limitations or repose has run on the plaintiff’s claim against
that person. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not
directly decided whether the fault of a person not liable to the
plaintiff because of a statute of limitations defense should be
305. Id. Note that other jurisdictions have specific standards for making this
determination.
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. f
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5) (six-year statute for negligence
claims); id. § 541.07(1) (two-year statute for certain intentional torts).
309. See id. § 541.051, subdiv. 1(a) (ten-year statute of repose for
improvements to real property).
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submitted to the factfinder, the court’s precedent with respect to
contribution claims indicates that it would.
The court regards the statute of limitations as a “technical”
310
defense that does not go to the merits of the case. “[I]t is a factor
311
extrinsic to the tort itself . . . by which liability is avoided.” If the
312
statute of limitations is not a bar to the contribution claim, and
the person against whom the contribution claim has been asserted
is a party to the litigation, that person’s fault obviously has to be
submitted to the factfinder to determine whether there is joint and
several liability in the first place and, if so, what the fair share is of
the person against whom contribution is sought.
Even if the person against whom the statute has run is not a
party to the litigation, that person’s fault would arguably have to be
submitted. The statute of limitations is still only a “technical”
313
defense, and to achieve a fair apportionment of fault under the
Minnesota rationale for including the fault of “parties to the
transaction,” the person’s fault would have to be submitted to the
factfinder.
4.

Persons Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction

The Restatement position in the several liability track permits
the inclusion of persons who are not subject to personal
314
jurisdiction in the allocation of fault. Comment (f) to section B19
states that “[b]efore assigning responsibility to nonparties, they
should be sufficiently identified that they could be joined in the
suit (regardless of whether personal jurisdiction or subject-matter
jurisdiction would exist) or that discovery could be obtained from
315
them.” Minnesota has not yet faced this issue. If it follows the
Restatement, Minnesota will treat persons not subject to

310. See Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 729–30 (Minn. 1981).
311. Horton v. Orbeth, 342 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Minn. 1984) (emphasis
omitted).
312. See City of Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc., 512 N.W.2d 872,
875 (Minn. 1994) (explaining the equitable reasons for allowing contribution
claims against a party to whom the plaintiff’s claim is barred by a statute of
limitations).
313. See Horton, 342 N.W.2d at 114.
314. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. f
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
315. Id.
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jurisdiction the same as persons against whom a statute of
limitations has run.
5.

Persons Who Are Immune from Liability

The Minnesota courts have not yet taken a position on the
issue of whether the fault of persons who are immune from liability
by operation of statute or common law should be considered in the
apportionment of fault. The exception is Hosley, in which the
supreme court permitted the allocation of fault to a defendant who
was severed from the lawsuit because of the filing of a chapter 11
316
petition for reorganization. Whether the fault of immune persons
or entities should be considered should turn on the nature of the
immunity.
There are various cases in which immunities may prevent the
imposition of liability on an individual or entity. The term
“immunity” is used here to describe cases in which persons,
including governmental entities, are immune from liability, either
317
by statute or common law. The supreme court has abolished
certain common law immunities, including interspousal tort
318
319
immunity,
parent-child tort immunity,
and charitable
320
immunity. That leaves various other immunities, both statutory
and common law, that preclude imposition of liability in cases
where either the legislature or the supreme court has determined
that certain conduct is deserving of protection from civil liability.
a.

Governmental Immunities

Governmental entities and officials are insulated from liability
in three basic ways. The nature of the immunity will determine
whether the fault of a governmental entity or official is subject to
allocation under the Comparative Fault Act.

316. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 292–93 (Minn. 1986).
Filing of the petition results in an automatic stay of judicial proceedings. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(1) (1982).
317. The term has a broader meaning in the Restatement. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. e.
318. See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969).
319. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980).
320. See Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 398,
175 N.W. 699, 701 (1920).
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Government is insulated from liability by statute for damages
321
or injuries caused by a variety of governmental actions, including
discretionary decisions occurring at the policy level (statutory
322
immunity). Government is also insulated from liability in cases
where the duty owed to an injured person is a public rather than a
private duty. Finally, government officials and their employers may
be shielded from liability because of official and vicarious official
immunity.
Statutory immunity provides protection for “policy-making
323
activities that are legislative or executive in nature.” It applies to
planning-level decisions involving social, political, or economic
324
considerations. It is inapplicable in cases involving operationallevel decisions involving “day-to-day operations of the government,”
the exercise of professional judgment, or “the application of
325
scientific and technical skills.” The purpose of statutory immunity
is to avoid “judicial second-guessing” of the policy decisions of
326
other branches of government.
Governmental entities are also shielded from liability by the
327
judicially created public-private duty distinction. A governmental
entity that assumes a special duty to certain members of the public
may be held liable to a person injured as a result of the breach of
duty, but not in cases where the government violates an obligation
328
owed only to the general public. The fault of the governmental
entity would not be submitted to the factfinder in cases involving a
329
violation of a public duty by the entity.

321. See MINN. STAT. §§ 3.736, subdiv. 3, 466.03, subdivs. 3–6b.
322. See id. at §§ 3.736, subdiv. 3(b), 466.03, subdiv. 6.
323. Nusbaum v. Blue Earth Cty., 422 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 1988).
324. Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 231–32 (Minn. 1988). The
governmental entity bears the burden of establishing that its decisions are covered
by statutory immunity. Conlin v. City of St. Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Minn.
2000).
325. Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 232–33 (internal citations omitted).
326. Schroeder v. St. Louis Cty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Minn. 2006) (citing
Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 718).
327. Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. 1981); Cracraft v. City of St.
Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979).
328. Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. 1986) (citing Hage, 304
N.W.2d at 286; Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806).
329. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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Finally, government employees and entities employing them
may assert official immunity for claims involving the exercise of
330
judgment or discretion at the operational level. Official immunity
331
is a common law creation. It insulates “public official[s] charged
by law with duties which call for the exercise of . . . judgment . . .
332
from being held personally liable to an individual for damages.”
Generally, when official immunity applies, the governmental entity
employing the person who committed the tort will be insulated
333
from liability by vicarious official immunity. Official immunity is
inapplicable where “a ministerial duty is either not performed or is
performed negligently” or “when a willful or malicious wrong is
334
committed.”
There are various cases in which the issue will arise as to
whether the fault of a governmental entity or official should be
considered in the allocation of fault. Two examples illustrate how it
could work. First, a plaintiff might sustain injury in a motor vehicle
accident that is the result of negligence on the part of a driver and
a highway hazard that is the consequence of disrepair. Or, as
another example, the plaintiff might be injured because of the
negligence of a driver and a police officer who is pursuing the
driver in a high speed chase.
In the first example the issue is whether the fault of the
governmental entity should be considered in the allocation of fault.
If the road repair decision is a policy decision involving political,
economic, and social factors, the claim against the governmental
entity would be barred by statutory immunity, even if the decision
not to repair could be deemed to be negligent.
The dismissal because of statutory immunity is the result of a
legislative policy decision not to subject planning-level policy
decisions made by governmental entities to scrutiny through
lawsuits. Where statutory liability applies there is simply no duty

330. See MINN. STAT. § 466.03, subdiv. 6.
331. See Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 1992) (quoting Susla v.
State, 311 Minn. 166, 175, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)) (citing Elwood v. Rice
Cty., 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988)).
332. Schroeder v. St. Louis Cty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2006) (quoting
Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677) (citing Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist.
11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. 2004)).
333. Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 663–64 (citations omitted).
334. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 505 (citing Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 662).
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owed by the governmental entity to the injured person. Statutory
335
immunity puts the fault issue out of reach.
In the second example assume that the police officer was
negligent; the claim is barred by official immunity not because the
police officer was not negligent, but because the police officer’s
336
decision to engage in the high speed chase was discretionary.
Neither the police officer nor the governmental entity employing
the officer would be liable unless the plaintiff could overcome the
immunity. Official and vicarious official immunity differ from
statutory immunity, however. Where statutory immunity applies the
governmental entity owes no duty to the injured person. Official
immunity applies to shield an at-fault official (and the employer)
from liability for the official’s fault.
Procedurally, if the plaintiff brings suit against the entity or
official and the statutory immunity defense is established on
motion for summary judgment, the governmental entity would be
dismissed from the suit. No duty would be owing and there would
be no basis for submitting the fault of the governmental entity to
the trier of fact. If statutory immunity is inapplicable the entity
would be subject to liability for the fault of the government official
who caused the injury to the plaintiff.
In a case involving a suit against an official and the
governmental entity employing the official where the official
immunity defense is asserted, the outcome would differ. If official
(and vicarious official) immunity is asserted but overcome by the
335. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability section D19,
comment h, explains the difference in immunities:
[I]mmunities sometimes may be an alternative way of stating that the
person has no legal duty or has not breached any duty that exists.
Thus, for example, a municipality may be “immune” from suit for
failing to provide police protection to an individual who was assaulted.
This “immunity” may obscure that a municipality has no duty of care in
tort law to the general public to prevent assaults and/or that there was
no reasonable means of precaution by which to prevent any such
assault, such that any duty that might have existed was not breached as
a matter of law. Identifying those immune persons who are truly
immune despite tortious conduct that would be actionable and those
whose immunity is an alternative way of stating that there is no duty or
no breach of duty may be uncertain and difficult. Courts must,
nevertheless, carefully analyze these issues in determining whether an
immune party may be assigned a percentage of comparative
responsibility.
336. E.g., Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992).
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plaintiff (or a defendant on a third-party claim) by establishing that
337
the official engaged in willful or malicious conduct, the fault of
the official would be subject to allocation by the trier of fact. A
potential problem will arise, however, if the plaintiff is unable to
overcome the immunity. Neither the official nor the employing
entity could be liable, but the official could nonetheless be found
negligent. Under those circumstances there is an argument that
the fault of the official should be submitted to the trier of fact for
allocation. The conduct is tortious, even if the immunity cannot be
overcome.
b.

Other Immunities

There are other cases where the legislature has enacted
statutes that make certain conduct immune from liability. The
function of the immunities is to insulate from liability conduct that
is socially useful. There are various examples, but two will suffice.
The Good Samaritan statute provides immunity from liability,
338
even if a person engaging in a rescue effort is negligent. Willful
339
and wanton or reckless conduct is necessary to trigger liability.
Another example is the immunity provided to volunteer
340
athletic coaches and officials, as well as physicians and trainers. As
with the Good Samaritan statute, the immunity is inapplicable in
cases where the person asserting the immunity has acted in a willful
341
and wanton or reckless manner.

337. See Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 505 (citing Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 662).
338. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subdiv. 2. The Good Samaritan statute reads in
pertinent part as follows:
A person who, without compensation or the expectation of
compensation, renders emergency care, advice, or assistance at the
scene of an emergency or during transit to a location where
professional medical care can be rendered, is not liable for any civil
damages as a result of acts or omissions by that person in rendering the
emergency care, advice, or assistance, unless the person acts in a willful
and wanton or reckless manner in providing the care, advice, or
assistance. This subdivision does not apply to a person rendering
emergency care, advice, or assistance during the course of regular
employment, and receiving compensation or expecting to receive
compensation for rendering the care, advice, or assistance.
Id. § 604A.01, subdiv. 2(a).
339. Id.
340. Id. § 604A.11, subdiv. 1.
341. Id. § 604A.11, subdiv. 2. The list of exceptions is as follows:
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In each case, the person who seeks the immunity would be
subject to liability according to an ordinary negligence standard,
absent the immunity. If the immunity applies, the plaintiff seeking
to recover against the person asserting the immunity would have to
prove willful and wanton or reckless misconduct in order to
342
recover. One argument is that the fault of those persons should
not be considered unless the plaintiff is able to establish willful and
wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the person asserting the
immunity. The other argument is that the immunity should be
treated the same as official immunity in cases involving claims
against governmental officials. Where that immunity applies, an
official may be negligent but nonetheless immune from liability
unless the plaintiff is able to overcome the immunity by proving
343
willful or malicious conduct. Even assuming the official has not
acted willfully or maliciously, however, the official may still have
been negligent, and if so, that negligence should arguably be
considered in any allocation of fault.
There would be no reason to treat these statutory immunities
any differently than the official immunity. Persons asserting the
immunity may be negligent and their fault subject to
apportionment even if they are not liable. It is consistent with the

(1) to the extent that the acts or omissions are covered under an
insurance policy issued to the entity for whom the coach, manager,
official, physician, or certified athletic trainer serves;
(2) if the individual acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in
providing the services or assistance;
(3) if the acts or omissions arise out of the operation, maintenance, or
use of a motor vehicle;
(4) to an athletic coach, manager, or official who provides services or
assistance as part of a public or private educational institution’s athletic
program;
(5) to a public or private educational institution for which a physician
or certified athletic trainer provides services; or
(6) if the individual acts in violation of federal, state, or local law.
Id.
342. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subdiv. 2; see also Tiedeman v. Morgan, 435
N.W.2d 86, 86–89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (reasoning that willful and wanton or
reckless acts would have triggered an exception to the Good Samaritan statute, but
ultimately finding the statute inapplicable for other reasons), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 29, 1989).
343. See supra Section IV.B.5.a.
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rationale of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and prior Minnesota
344
case law, including Staab I.
6.

Summary

Even before the Staab decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had started down the road of permitting the fault of nonparties to
be considered in the allocation of fault. Staab I extended the rule
by permitting allocation of fault to a clearly identified nonparty
who could have been joined in the litigation by either the plaintiff
345
or defendant. Having headed down that road in Frey, Lines, and
346
Hosley, there seem to be few stop signs along the way. The fault of
a variety of parties may be considered in the allocation of fault,
including the fault of settling parties, certain identified persons,
persons against whom a statute of limitations or repose has run,
and certain parties who are immune from liability because of
common law or statutory immunities. There may be distinctions
between these categories of cases, but once the supreme court
made the decision to allocate fault to nonparties, supported by the
policy that it is necessary to do so to achieve a fair allocation of
fault, the distinctions seem to be without a sustainable difference.
C.

Procedural Issues

Minnesota currently has no specific procedural requirements
that have to be satisfied before the fault of a nonparty may be
considered in the fault allocation question and no specific
mechanism for challenging the inclusion of the nonparty. Other
jurisdictions have established procedures to be followed before a
nonparty’s fault may be considered. Michigan, for example,

344. If the person asserting the immunity is a party to the suit, the plaintiff’s
claim could turn on the plaintiff’s ability to satisfy the higher standard of proof
required by official immunity or the immunity provided by other statutes. If the
plaintiff is unable to meet the higher standard of willful, wanton, or reckless
conduct, there would still be an issue as to whether the immune party was
negligent. Then, if the courts take the position that the fault of immune persons
should be considered in the allocation of fault, there would have to be a second
special verdict question asking whether the person was negligent. A finding of
causal negligence would be a basis for considering the fault of the immune
person.
345. See Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012).
346. See supra Section II.B.
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347

requires notice before the fault of a nonparty may be considered.
Arizona requires consideration of “the fault of all persons who
contributed to the alleged injury, death or damage to property,
regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named
348
as a party to the suit.” The accompanying rule requires a party
who seeks to include a nonparty to “provide the identity, location,
and the facts supporting the claimed liability of such non-party
349
. . . .”
The Restatement suggests a basic procedure for challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence to justify including a nonparty in the
allocation of fault:
Any nonparty that a party proposes for assignment of
responsibility could be the subject of a ruling by the court
on the sufficiency of the evidence to permit assignment of
a percentage of comparative responsibility. The inquiry
would be similar to a motion for a directed verdict or for
judgment as a matter of law, except that the motion would
347. MICH. CT. R. 2.112, subdiv. K(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016). The
notice requirement reads in part as follows:
(a) A party against whom a claim is asserted may give notice of a claim
that a nonparty is wholly or partially at fault. A notice filed by one party
identifying a particular nonparty serves as notice by all parties as to that
nonparty.
(b) The notice shall designate the nonparty and set forth the
nonparty’s name and last known address, or the best identification of
the nonparty that is possible, together with a brief statement of the
basis for believing the nonparty is at fault.
Id. 2.112, subdiv. K(3)(a)–(b).
348. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg.
Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.).
349. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015). The rule reads in
full as follows:
Any party who alleges, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2506(B), that a person
or entity not currently or formerly named as a party was wholly or
partially at fault in causing any personal injury, property damage or
wrongful death for which damages are sought in the action shall
provide the identity, location, and the facts supporting the claimed
liability of such non-party within one hundred fifty (150) days after the
filing of that party’s answer. The trier of fact shall not be permitted to
allocate or apportion any percentage of fault to any non-party whose
identity is not disclosed in accordance with the requirements of this
subsection except upon written agreement of the parties or upon
motion establishing good cause, reasonable diligence, and lack of
unfair prejudice to other parties.
Id.
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not be made by a party seeking dismissal, but by another
party seeking a determination that the evidence of a
nonparty’s conduct is insufficient to permit the factfinder
350
to assign responsibility to that nonparty.
The general principle that can be drawn from these sources is
that the party who seeks to have the fault of a nonparty submitted
on the allocation question should provide timely notice of the
name and last known address of the nonparty, along with
351
something like “a short and plain statement of the claim” that
indicates the basis for a finding of fault on the nonparty. The
352
requirements could be made part of the scheduling order.
The plaintiff should be able to test by pretrial motion the issue
of whether the fault of a nonparty may be considered, either
because the nonparty belongs to a class of persons whose fault
should not be considered as a matter of law or, if there is no
argument on that issue, whether there is sufficient evidence of fault
to consider the fault of the nonparty in the allocation of fault.
V. STAAB, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, AND LOSS REALLOCATION
Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 2 provides that
if “a party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from
that party,” any uncollectible amount shall be reallocated among
the other parties, including the plaintiff, “according to their
353
respective percentages of fault.” After Staab II, there is an issue as
to whether the loss reallocation provision has any life. It does, but
before the loss reallocation statute can apply, a party to the
litigation will have to be in a position where it is asked to pay more
than its fair share of an obligation. This can happen only where the
party seeking to reallocate an uncollectible amount is jointly and
severally liable. A party who is only severally liable will never seek to
reallocate because, by definition, that party will be responsible for
only his or her equitable share of the obligation and no more.
There are four situations where the rule of joint and several
354
liability will apply, according to section 604.02, subdivision 1. The
350. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § B19 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) (citation omitted).
351. MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
352. See id. 16.02. The scheduling order may include “any other matters
appropriate in the circumstances of the case.” Id. 16.02(g).
353. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2 (2014).
354. See id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1. There are other cases, such as vicarious liability
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relationship between joint and several liability and loss reallocation
will differ depending on the basis for a finding of joint and several
liability.
The first exception makes a party who is more than 50% at
355
fault jointly and severally liable. The rule of joint and several
liability will make that party liable for 100% of the plaintiff’s
damages (assuming no fault is assigned to the plaintiff). The jointly
and severally liable defendant who pays more than its fair share
would have a contribution claim against any other defendant, to
the extent of that defendant’s fault, or against a nonparty in a
subsequent action for contribution, but the burden of establishing
uncollectibility falls on the jointly and severally liable defendant.
To illustrate, assume the following:
Party
P
D1
D2
NP3

Percentage of Fault
0%
60%
20%
20%

D1 and D2 are parties to the suit. NP3 is a nonparty who was
assigned a percentage of fault. Assume damages of $100,000.
Under the rule of joint and several liability, D1 is liable for
100% of the plaintiff’s damages. If D2 is able to satisfy its share of
the judgment, D1 will still be jointly and severally liable for 80% of
the plaintiff’s damages. If D1 is obligated to pay the plaintiff those
damages, D1 would have a contribution claim against D2 for D2’s
share of the damages. D1 bears the burden of proving the
uncollectibility of those damages on the contribution claim. NP3 is
not liable on a contribution claim because NP3 is not a party to the
suit and would not be bound either by a jury’s finding of fault or
the percentage of fault assigned to NP3. D1 would have to establish
the right to contribution in a separate action. Assuming, for the
moment, that NP3 is insolvent, no part of NP3’s share of the
obligation would be subject to reallocation. No part of NP3’s fault
could be reallocated to D2, even if it satisfied its contribution
obligation, because D2 is only severally liable.

cases, that also would have to fit within the concept. See Steenson, supra note 14, at
875–77.
355. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(1).
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If, however, the plaintiff is at fault, reallocation is a possibility.
To illustrate, assume the following:
Party
P
D1
D2

Percentage of Fault
20%
60%
20%

If D2 is unable to satisfy its share of the judgment, D1 would be
jointly and severally liable to P for 80% of the damages. If D1 is
unable to shift 20% of that loss to D2 on a contribution claim
because of D2’s insolvency, D1 would seek to reallocate that
uncollectible amount in part to P, pursuant to section 604.02,
356
subdivision 2. If damages are $100,000, D2’s share, $20,000,
would be reallocated to D1 and P according to their respective
percentages of fault. That means that D1 would bear three-fourths
of the uncollectible amount ($15,000) and P would bear onefourth of that amount ($5,000).
If a defendant is held jointly and severally liable because of
participation in a common scheme or plan resulting in injury to
the plaintiff, the interaction between joint and several liability and
357
loss reallocation is different.
To illustrate the application, assume the following:
Party
P
D1
D2
D3

Percentage of Fault
0%
60%
20%
20%

Assume damages of $100,000. Also assume that D1, D2, and D3
are part of a common scheme or plan that resulted in injury to the
plaintiff. If D3 is unable to satisfy its share of the obligation, the
uncollectible amount would be reallocated to the remaining jointly
and severally liable defendants. The Staab decisions would not
apply to limit the liability of D2, because even though D2 is 50% or
less at fault, D2 is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the
full amount of the judgment because of participation in the
356.
357.

Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 2.
Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(2).
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common scheme or plan. D3’s share ($20,000) would be
reallocated between D1 and D2 according to their respective
percentages of fault. That means that D1 would bear three-fourths
of the uncollectible amount ($15,000) and D2 would bear onefourth of that amount ($5,000). D1’s total liability would be
$75,000 and D2’s $25,000. The result would not change if D3 were
not a party to the common scheme or plan. D2’s uncollectible
358
share would still have to be reallocated between D1 and D2.
The result should be the same if the defendants were all held
liable pursuant to the environmental liability statutes noted in
359
section 604.02, subdivision 1.
There would not be a possibility of reallocation in a case
involving a defendant who is jointly and severally liable because of
an intentional tort. As an example, assume a case where there are
two defendants, one liable for committing an intentional tort and
one for negligence in failing to prevent that tort. Section 604.02,
subdivision 1 states that “a person who commits an intentional tort”
360
is jointly and severally liable for the whole award.
There are at least two problems with reallocation in this case.
One is that there appears to be no basis for comparing the fault of
a negligent defendant with a defendant who has committed an
361
intentional tort.
In order for loss reallocation to apply, a
defendant would have to pay more than its fair share of the
judgment, be unable to obtain contribution from a co-defendant,
and seek to shift a proportionate share of the uncollectible amount
to an at-fault plaintiff. None of those prerequisites can be met
because of the lack of a statutory mechanism for the comparison of
intentional wrongdoing with negligence. In fact, the negligent
defendant could be held liable for the actions of the intentional
362
tortfeasor.

358. The court indicted that this would be the result in Staab I. See Staab I, 813
N.W.2d 68, 79 n.9 (Minn. 2012).
359. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(4).
360. Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(3).
361. See id. § 604.01, subdiv. 1a. The Comparative Fault Act’s definition of
“fault” does not include liability based on an intentional tort. Id.
362. See, e.g., ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Swenson, 687 F. Supp. 2d 884, 894–96 (D.
Minn. 2009) (acknowledging statutory ambiguity on this issue, but relying on the
Restatement’s position that a negligent defendant may be “jointly and severally
liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to the intentional
tortfeasor”).
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VI. STAAB AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Products liability cases are subject to a special reallocation rule
in Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 3:
In the case of a claim arising from the manufacture, sale,
use or consumption of a product, an amount
uncollectible from any person in the chain of
manufacture and distribution shall be reallocated among
all other persons in the chain of manufacture and
distribution but not among the claimant or others at fault
who are not in the chain of manufacture or distribution of
the product. Provided, however, that a person whose fault
is less than that of a claimant is liable to the claimant only
for that portion of the judgment which represents the
percentage of fault attributable to the person whose fault
363
is less.
Subdivision 3 reallocation applies only to product sellers and
364
manufacturers in the chain of manufacture and distribution. The
impact of this section is to treat all parties in the chain of
manufacture and distribution as a unit. If fault is apportioned
among two or more parties in the chain, and one is unable to pay
its fair share, that share will be reallocated to the remaining parties
who are in the chain. There will be no reallocation to other parties,
including the plaintiff, presumably as long as there is at least one
party in the chain who bears responsibility for the injury-causing
defective product. Subdivision 3 effectively creates a rule of joint
and several liability applicable to parties in the chain of
365
manufacture and distribution.
366
Subdivision 3 uses the term “person” rather than “party.”
The Staab decisions construe “person” to include parties to the
363. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 3.
364. Unrelated product sellers are not covered. See Tester v. Am. Standard,
Inc., 590 N.W.2d 679, 680–81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding subdivision 3
inapplicable to independent asbestos manufacturers).
365. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 3. The last sentence of subdivision 3 does
impose a limitation on the liability of a party in the chain of manufacture and
distribution. Id. The liability of a person who is less at fault than the plaintiffs is
limited to that person’s percentage of fault. Id. If parties in the unit are effectively
treated as a unit, however, it makes little sense for a party in the chain to avoid
joint and several liability simply because fault can be split among parties in the
chain. Given the fact that intermediaries are likely to be dismissed under
Minnesota Statutes section 544.41, the last sentence should have limited impact.
366. Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 3.

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

1220

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

[Vol. 42:1156

367

transaction. If the manufacturer is a party to a products liability
lawsuit, the manufacturer could seek to join other intermediaries
in the chain of manufacture and distribution, even if the plaintiff
does not join them, or the manufacturer could simply seek to have
the intermediaries included in the fault allocation question. The
Staab decisions might point that way, but there are reasons why the
fault of the intermediaries should not be included because of the
application of Minnesota Statutes section 544.41, which entitles
intermediaries in the chain to dismissal of strict liability claims
against them if the manufacturer is solvent and subject to
368
jurisdiction in Minnesota. There are two key points to be made.

367. Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 2014); Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 75
n.5 (Minn. 2012).
368. MINN. STAT. § 544.41. The statute reads in full as follows:
Subdivision 1. Product liability; requirements. In any product liability
action based in whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or
maintained against a defendant other than the manufacturer, that
party shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit
certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer of the product
allegedly causing injury, death or damage. The commencement of a
product liability action based in whole or part on strict liability in tort
against a certifying defendant shall toll the applicable statute of
limitation relative to the defendant for purposes of asserting a strict
liability in tort cause of action.
[Subdivision 2]. Certifying defendant; dismissal of strict liability. Once
the plaintiff has filed a complaint against a manufacturer and the
manufacturer has or is required to have answered or otherwise
pleaded, the court shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort
claim against the certifying defendant, provided the certifying
defendant is not within the categories set forth in subdivision 3. Due
diligence shall be exercised by the certifying defendant in providing
the plaintiff with the correct identity of the manufacturer and due
diligence shall be exercised by the plaintiff in filing a law suit and
obtaining jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to dismissal move to vacate
the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying defendant, provided
plaintiff can show one of the following:
(1) that the applicable statute of limitation bars the assertion of a strict
liability in tort cause of action against the manufacturer of the product
allegedly causing the injury, death or damage;
(2) that the identity of the manufacturer given to the plaintiff by the
certifying defendant was incorrect. Once the correct identity of the
manufacturer has been given by the certifying defendant the court
shall again dismiss the certifying defendant;
(3) that the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject to the

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

THE STAAB SAGA

1221

First, if the only claim against the intermediary is a strict liability
claim, the intermediary is dismissed from the litigation. There
would be no basis for any allocation of fault to that intermediary. It
follows that the result should be the same if the manufacturer seeks
to include the intermediary on the special verdict form for the
allocation of fault if the only theory on which the intermediary
could be liable is a strict liability theory. The section 544.41
369
dismissal
effectively precludes liability on the basis of strict
liability. If there is no liability, there is no fault to be apportioned to
the intermediary and there should not be a line on the special
verdict form asking the trier of fact to apportion fault to the
intermediary.
Second, even if intermediaries in the chain of manufacture
and distribution are joined, it is questionable whether fault would
have to be split among those parties. If a product is defective, the
370
intermediary is liable for selling the product,
but the

jurisdiction of the courts of this state, or, despite due diligence, the
manufacturer is not amenable to service of process;
(4) that the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment as
determined by the court; or
(5) that the court determines that the manufacturer would be unable
to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with plaintiff.
[Subdivision 3]. Dismissal order prohibited. A court shall not enter a
dismissal order relative to any certifying defendant even though full
compliance with subdivision 1 has been made where the plaintiff can
show one of the following:
(1) that the defendant has exercised some significant control over the
design or manufacture of the product, or has provided instructions or
warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in the
product which caused the injury, death or damage;
(2) that the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect in the
product which caused the injury, death or damage; or
(3) that the defendant created the defect in the product which caused
the injury, death or damage.
[Subdivision 4]. Limiting constructing laws. Nothing contained in
subdivisions 1 to 3 shall be construed to create a cause of action in
strict liability in tort or based on other legal theory, or to affect the
right of any person to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution.
Id.
369. Id.
370. See Marcon v. Kmart Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding sled retailer liable for sale of sled even though jury assigned 100% of the
fault to the bankrupt manufacturer). The court of appeals noted that “[t]he
practical effect of strict-liability principles is to hold a faultless seller jointly and
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intermediary is a passive party, liable only for passing along a
defective product in the chain of distribution. There is no basis for
splitting fault in those cases. The intermediary is liable for selling a
defective product, even if the intermediary had no knowledge of
the defect and played no role in causing the defect.
If dismissal under section 544.41 is inappropriate because the
intermediary influenced the design of the product, had actual
knowledge of the defect, or created the defect, there may be a basis
for a finding of fault, in addition to the strict liability that flows, just
from the intermediary’s sale of the product. In the first two
situations, there would be a basis for allocating fault to the
intermediary. In the last, where the intermediary is responsible for
creating the defect, the intermediary could be found solely
responsible for the defect, of course.
Because the reallocation rule requires reallocation to other
parties in the chain, there is no reason to think that the Staab
decisions would apply to limit the liability of a party who is found to
be 50% or less at fault. All persons in the chain are treated as a
unit. If one party’s share is uncollectible, it should be reallocated to
the remaining parties in the chain, and only if the parties in the
chain were unable to satisfy their obligations would there be
reallocation to other parties, including the plaintiff.
In summary, the Staab decisions should not have an impact on
products liability cases where apportionment of fault among parties
in the chain of manufacture and distribution is concerned. The
Staab decisions permit consideration of the fault of nonparties, but
careful consideration has to be given to the circumstances where
that will occur. The general rationale that fault of all responsible
persons should be considered in the allocation of fault does not fit
in subdivision 3 cases.

severally liable for the causal fault of the manufacturer.” In re Shigellosis Litig., 647
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). For that proposition, the court relied on
Justice Simonett’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Hudson v. Snyder Body,
Inc., in which he noted that an intermediary in the case “is liable to plaintiffs but
only in a vicarious or derivative sense as the inert seller in the marketing chain.”
326 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Minn. 1982). He noted that “[t]his is not the kind of
conduct that needs to be included in a comparative fault question, and the jury
properly ignored it.” Id.
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VII. STAAB AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY
There is also a question as to whether the Staab decisions apply
in cases where a third party has a contribution against an employer.
371
It is clear from Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp. and subsequent
372
cases
that situations involving third-party claims against an
employer for contribution will be resolved under the comparative
fault structure, even if the common liability requirement, which is a
373
prerequisite for contribution claims, is technically missing.
374
have indicated that the comparative
Because prior cases
negligence statute and Comparative Fault Act are not applicable to
those contribution claims, even though comparative fault
principles are used to apportion fault among parties to that
litigation, there is an issue as to whether the Staab decisions will
apply to cap the fault of an employer found to be 50% or less at
fault.
The question was considered in Gaudreault v. Elite Line Services,
375
LLC. The plaintiff, a former equipment service manager for Delta
Airlines, was injured when a ground power cord unit that was
hanging from a jetway fell on him as he was working under the
376
jetway. The plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits
from Delta and later commenced suit against Elite Line Services
(ELS), “a company that provides operation and maintenance
377
services to airports and airlines.” ELS had a contract with Delta
for the inspection and maintenance of the ground equipment at

371. 312 Minn. 114, 119–20, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977).
372. See, e.g., Horton v. Orbeth, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 112, 114–15 (Minn. 1984).
373. Common liability is a prerequisite for contribution. See Ascheman v. Vill.
of Hancock, 254 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. 1977) (holding that the husband who
sustained injury leading to Civil Damage Act claim against the Village was not
liable on a contribution claim because of lack of common liability due to the fact
that husband had no direct liability to his wife and daughter for loss of their
means of support); Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 147, 241 N.W.2d 641,
643 (1976) (holding that no common liability existed where a person from whom
contribution is sought was found not liable in a previous proceeding) (internal
quotation omitted).
374. Id.
375. 22 F. Supp. 3d 966 (D. Minn. 2014).
376. Id. at 969. A ground power cord unit can weigh over 150 pounds. Id. The
cord can be attached to the side of the jetway with a hanger assembly that permits
the cord to be hoisted up and down from that position by the ground crew. Id.
377. Id.

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

1224

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

[Vol. 42:1156
378

Minneapolis Saint Paul Airport, where the plaintiff was working.
379
The plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against ELS. ELS filed a
third-party complaint against Delta, “asserting a right of
380
contribution.”
In one of its pre-trial motions, ELS asked for an order granting
partial summary judgment finding that ELS could not be held
jointly and severally liable unless found to be more than 50% at
381
fault. The court viewed it as “in essence, a request for clarification
about the intersection of Minnesota law on joint and several
382
liability with the no-fault workers’ compensation scheme.”
The issue in the case concerned the impact of the 2003
amendment of the Comparative Fault Act on the apportionment of
fault in a case involving a contribution claim by a third party
383
against an employer. Staab I would require the apportionment of
fault to the employer, even if it were not a party to the case, and a
finding that ELS is 50% or less at fault would mean that ELS could
384
be held only severally liable. If more than 50% at fault, however,
385
ELS would be jointly and severally liable. On the other hand,
following the line of cases dealing with an employer’s contribution
liability, it appears that the apportionment of fault among an
employer and third party is not controlled by the Comparative
Fault Act and is therefore not subject to the default rule of several
386
liability in the Act.
387
In Lambertson v. Cincinnati Welding Corp., the Minnesota
Supreme Court arrived at a compromise that avoided the potential
constitutional problems created by disallowing a claim for
contribution by a third-party tortfeasor while allowing an at-fault

378. Id.
379. Id. at 969–70.
380. Id. at 970.
381. Id. at 978.
382. Id. Procedurally, the court noted that there is “no basis” in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “for granting partial summary judgment on a
hypothetical question of this sort,” which required denying the motion, but
because the parties briefed and argued the issue, the court saw “no reason to defer
addressing an issue that the parties have indicated will be relevant to the
resolution of the case.” Id.
383. Id. at 978–79.
384. See Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 80 (Minn. 2012).
385. See id.
386. See id. at 81 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
387. 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
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employer to receive reimbursement for workers’ compensation
388
benefits paid to an injured employee. The court held that a thirdparty tortfeasor had a right to contribution against an employer
whose fault caused injury to an employee, but preserved the
balance struck in the Workers’ Compensation Act by limiting the
right of contribution to the employer’s percentage of fault or
389
workers’ compensation, whichever is less. The solution was a
practical one:
While there is no common liability to the employee in
tort, both the employer and the third party are
nonetheless liable to the employee for his injuries; the
employer through the fixed no-fault workers’
compensation system and the third party through the
variable recovery available in a common law tort action.
Contribution is a flexible, equitable remedy designed to
accomplish a fair allocation of loss among parties. Such a
remedy should be utilized to achieve fairness on
particular facts, unfettered by outworn technical concepts
390
like common liability.
Because contribution is an equitable remedy “unfettered by
391
the
outworn technical concepts like common liability,”
Comparative Fault Act does not control the employer’s liability on
a contribution claim, notwithstanding the absence of common law,
392
common liability between an employer and third party tortfeasor.
Subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions continued to take
393
that position.
394
In Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., the court held that the
Comparative Fault Act does not affect the apportionment
procedure set out in Johnson, and “that a third-party tortfeasor may
recover contribution from a negligent employer under the
principles of Lambertson and Johnson whether or not the employee,
in a direct suit, would have been barred from recovery under the
395
comparative-fault statute.” Hudson permitted contribution against
the employer even though the employer’s fault was equal to the
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 689.
Id.
Id. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (2014).
See Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 158.
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plaintiff’s (under the comparative negligence statute in existence at
the time a plaintiff was barred from recovery if the plaintiff’s fault
was equal to or greater than the fault of the person from whom
396
recovery was sought). The court permitted a result that would
have been precluded had the employer been a defendant subject to
397
traditional tort liability.
398
In Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., decided three years later, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that “section 604.02[] does not
govern an employer’s contribution or an offset to an employer’s
subrogation claim,” and that an employer’s obligation is limited to
its obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits, “even though
the employer’s fault-based share of the damages would have been
399
greater.”
Following Hudson, the court concluded “that the
statutory apportionment of damages” in the Comparative Fault Act
“does not govern an employer’s contribution or an offset to an
400
employer’s subrogation claim.” The court explained:
We agree with U.S. Steel that the statutory apportionment
of damages, section 604.02, does not govern an
employer’s contribution or an offset to an employer’s
subrogation claim. Clark and U.S. Steel are neither jointly
liable nor jointly and severally liable to U.S. Steel’s
employee. An employer’s obligation with respect to the
employee’s damages is limited by his obligation for
workers’ compensation benefits even though the
employer’s fault-based share of the damages would have
been greater. On the other hand, an employer’s
subrogation against a more culpable third-party is denied
to the extent of the employer’s proportionate share of the
fault even though the employer was less at fault than the
401
injured employee.
This strain of authority clearly acknowledges that while the
structure of the Comparative Fault Act is used for purposes of
apportioning fault, the Act does not limit the third party
402
tortfeasor’s right of contribution against the employer. It also

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at 157–58.
Id. at 158.
370 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1985).
Id. at 420–21.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 420–21 (citations omitted).
Id. at 421.
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clearly states that the third party and the employer are neither
403
jointly nor severally liable to the injured employee.
When Lambertson was decided, the rule of joint and several
liability had not yet been modified by the legislature, and the
Workers’ Compensation Act was silent on the issue of contribution
404
from the employer. In Johnson v. Raske Building Systems, Inc., the
court adopted a procedure for application of the Lambertson
principle:
The third-party tortfeasors . . . should pay the entire
verdict . . . to the plaintiff. The employer should then
contribute to the third-party tortfeasor an amount
proportionate to its percentage of negligence, but not to
exceed the amount of workers’ compensation benefits
payable to the employee. . . . The employee . . . should
then reimburse the employer pursuant to [section
405
176.061, subdivision 6(c)].
The Johnson procedure requires the third party tortfeasor to
406
pay the plaintiff the entire verdict. The employer then pays the
third party on the contribution claim an amount equal to its
407
workers’ compensation or fair share of the verdict. The employer
is then reimbursed for its workers’ compensation payments from
408
the plaintiff-employee’s tort recovery. The rough net effect is that
the third party obtains contribution, capped by the employer’s
409
workers’ compensation liability. The employer’s liability is limited
410
to no more than its workers’ compensation liability. The plaintiffemployee’s recovery is reduced by the workers’ compensation
411
liability in order to avoid any double recovery.
403. Id. at 420.
404. 276 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 80.
410. Id.
411. See Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, 258 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Minn. 1977).
In Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, the court held:
So long as the employer is notified of negotiations leading to such a
settlement so that it can appear or intervene to protect its interest and
so long as the employee demonstrates that the settlement concerns
only damages not recoverable under worker’s compensation, or
allocates the settlement into recoverable and nonrecoverable claims,
the employer cannot credit the nonrecoverable portion of the
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In 2000, the legislature added subdivision 11 to section
176.061 of the Workers’ Compensation Act that addresses the right
of contribution:
To the extent the employer has fault, separate from the
fault of the injured employee to whom workers’
compensation benefits are payable, any nonemployer
third party who is liable has a right of contribution against
the employer in an amount proportional to the
employer’s percentage of fault but not to exceed the net
amount the employer recovered pursuant to subdivision
6, paragraphs (b) and (c). The employer may avoid
contribution exposure by affirmatively waiving, before
selection of the jury, the right to recover workers’
compensation benefits paid and payable, thus removing
compensation benefits from the damages payable by any
third party.
Procedurally, if the employer waives or settles the right to
recover workers’ compensation benefits paid and payable,
the employee or the employee’s dependents have the
option to present all common law or wrongful death
damages whether they are recoverable under the
Workers’ Compensation Act or not. Following the verdict,
the trial court will deduct any awarded damages that are
duplicative of workers’ compensation benefits paid or
412
payable.
Paragraph one incorporates Lambertson, but also provides that
the employer may avoid contribution by the third party if, prior to
jury selection, it waives the right to recover workers’ compensation
413
benefits from the damages payable by a third party. Double
recovery is still avoided because workers’ compensation benefits
will be deducted from any awarded damages that are duplicative of
the workers’ compensation benefits paid or payable to the plaintiff414
employee in the suit against the third party.
Notwithstanding the Minnesota Supreme Court’s statements
that the Comparative Fault Act does not apply in determining
whether an employer will be liable to a third party on a

settlement against compensation payments.
Id. at 894.
412. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 11 (2014).
413. Id.
414. Id.
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contribution claim, the Comparative Fault Act does apply when
the issue concerns the impact of allocation of fault to the employer
on the right of the plaintiff-employee to recover against a third
416
party. The court made that clear in Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc.
The plaintiff, employed by Bayliner Boats, was injured when a highspeed drill with a circular saw blade slipped in her hands when the
417
blade stuck in a hole she was drilling. The drill twisted violently,
418
causing serious injuries to her wrist and arm. She sued Sioux
Tools, the drill manufacturer. Sioux Tools impleaded Bayliner
419
Boats, seeking contribution. The jury apportioned 35% of the
fault to the plaintiff, 20% to Sioux Tools, and 45% to Bayliner
420
Boats. Because the Comparative Fault Act requires individual
comparisons of fault, and because the plaintiff’s percentage of fault
was greater than Sioux Tools’ fault, the plaintiff was barred from
421
recovery.
The plaintiff argued that the fault of her employer and Sioux
Tools should be aggregated and that refusing to do so would
extend the employer’s immunity from suit to the third party
manufacturer, in effect allowing the third party to “borrow” some
422
of the employer’s immunity. The court rejected that argument,
noting that the plaintiff was not barred from recovery because of
her employer’s immunity, but rather because a jury found her to be
423
more negligent than the third-party manufacturer. The court
found Bayliner’s status to be irrelevant to the issue of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recover when the plaintiff’s fault is greater
424
than the fault of the person from whom recovery is sought. The
court rejected as “pure speculation” the argument that the fault
apportionment would have been different had the employer’s fault
425
not been considered.
The court also pointed out that Bayliner’s fault would still have
been submitted to the jury even had a contribution claim not been
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

See Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 1985).
Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1982).
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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426

asserted. The court’s conclusion was based on Lines v. Ryan, a
1978 decision in which the court held that the fault of a nonparty
427
428
could be considered in apportioning fault. While Lines did not
involve the liability of an employer, the court in that case relied on
429
Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee,
in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the fault of the plaintiffemployee’s employer had to be considered in the fault allocation.
Cambern specifically appears to apply the Comparative Fault Act in
taking the position that the fault of the employer has to be
considered in the apportionment of fault and that it will have
430
consequences.
Cambern also has to be read in conjunction with the court’s
431
opinion in Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc. However, Hudson was
432
decided on the same day as Cambern, but without citing that case.
Hudson sustained serious injuries when the box of a dump truck
433
descended on his shoulder.
He brought suit against the
manufacturer of the truck hoist, the dealer that supplied the truck
chassis on which the dump truck box was mounted, and Snyder,
434
the assembler of the truck.
The truck hoist manufacturer
impleaded Hudson’s employer, seeking contribution and
435
indemnity. The jury found the plaintiff 20% at fault, the truck
hoist manufacturer 25% at fault, the assembler 35% at fault, and
436
the plaintiff’s employer 20% at fault.
The court held that an employer whose fault was equal to the
437
fault of the plaintiff would still be subject to liability on a
contribution claim by a third party, even though the employer
would not have been liable to the employee had a direct action

426. Id.
427. Lines v. Ryan, 276 N.W.2d 896, 902 (1978).
428. Id.
429. Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662–63 (Wis.
1975).
430. Cambern, 323 N.W.2d at 798.
431. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 151.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 154.
437. The case arose in 1974, four years before the amendments to the
comparative negligence statute turned it into a Comparative Fault Act. See id. at
151.
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438

been permitted against the employer. The court concluded that
“[t]he comparative-fault statute does not affect the apportionment
439
procedure set out in Johnson,” and that “a third-party tortfeasor
may recover contribution from a negligent employer under the
principles of Lambertson and Johnson whether or not the employee,
in a direct suit, would have been barred from recovery under the
440
comparative-fault statute.”
Justice Simonett, who wrote for the court in Cambern, dissented
from that part of the majority’s opinion in Hudson because of the
court’s creation of a special rule of pure comparative fault applied
441
only in cases involving employers. He noted that the problem of
the adjustment of liabilities and apportionment of loss where “the
principles of a common-law, comparative fault action conflict with
the counter policies of the workers’ compensation law [are]
perplexing,” and that in Lambertson the court “relaxed the technical
requirements for contribution” in order “to achieve a more
equitable result,” but he disagreed that the court should “now rely
442
on technicalities to relax comparative fault principles.”
After the 1978 amendment, an employer would be liable on a
contribution claim even if the fault of the plaintiff-employee was
443
greater than the fault of the employer. The employer’s fault is
capped by its percentage of fault or its workers’ compensation
444
liability, whichever is less. The key issue is whether the fault of the
third party will be limited after the Staab decisions in light of
Cambern and Hudson. The decision could go one of two ways. Either
the court could hold that the Comparative Fault Act does not apply
in the Lambertson setting, or it could hold that the Comparative
Fault Act does apply to limit the liability of the third party. The
cases from Lambertson through Hudson suggest the first. Cambern
suggests the second.

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
720.

Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2014).
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2 (2014); see also Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at
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445

The federal district court in Gaudreault took the second
position, finding that Staab I is decisive on the issue, but without
mentioning either Hudson or Cambern in its opinion:
After Staab, it is beyond dispute that “a tortfeasor’s
liability—whether joint, several, or both—arises and exists
independently of the tortfeasor’s participation in a lawsuit
and, therefore, is independent of the tortfeasor’s
obligation to contribute to any judgment entered in such
a lawsuit.” That Delta has no exposure in tort to
Gaudreault by operation of the Workers’ Compensation
Act is thus no barrier to the application of [section
446
604.02, subdivision 1] to a special verdict in this case.
Applying the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis in Staab I,
however, could well lead to the opposite conclusion. Nothing in
the 2000 amendment that added subdivision 11 to section 176.061
of the Workers’ Compensation Act changed the procedure the
447
supreme court adopted in Johnson v. Raske Building Systems, Inc.
Using the Staab I approach to legislative history, when the
448
legislature adopted several liability as the default rule in 2003,
449
which the court had held
replacing the “15% x 4” rule,
inapplicable in the employer/third party claim setting, it did so
with knowledge of the supreme court’s position on the issue. Had
the legislature intended to change that result, it could easily have
done so.
If there is no common law several liability because of the
employer’s immunity from suit, the Staab I rationale does not apply.
The court in Staab I relied on a conclusion that several liability and
joint and several liability are determined at the time the tort is
committed as a means of circumventing the problem created by the
requirement in section 604.02, subdivision 1 that the statute applies
450
“[w]hen two or more persons are severally liable.” The Minnesota
Supreme Court held in Kempa, however, that there can be no joint
and several liability between an employer and third party
451
tortfeasor.

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Gaudreault v. Elite Line Servs., LLC, 22 F. Supp. 3d 966 (D. Minn. 2014).
Id. at 981 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979).
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (2002 & Supp. 2003).
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (1988).
Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2012).
Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 1985).

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

THE STAAB SAGA

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

1233

In Decker v. Brunkow, the plaintiff, an employee of Oak Ridge
Homes, was injured when she slipped and fell on property owned
452
She brought suit against Brunkow, who then
by Brunkow.
brought a third party action against Oak Ridge, claiming
453
contribution or indemnity. A jury found Oak Ridge to be 95% at
454
fault and Brunkow 5%. Decker moved to allocate the entire
455
verdict of $125,020.93 to Brunkow. Brunkow argued that the
then-existing limitation on damages of a person 15% or less at fault
456
to no more than four times that percentage of fault applied.
457
The court of appeals rejected the argument.
Following
Lamberton and Kempa, the court noted that the lack of common
liability precluded a finding of joint liability, which was a
458
prerequisite for the application of the reallocation statute.
Neither party in the case argued that the legislature contemplated
the conflict between workers’ compensation law and the
459
contribution claim contemplated by Lambertson. The court of
appeals concluded, as did the supreme court in Lambertson, that any
460
change would have to be made by the legislature.
The 2000 amendment to the Workers’ Compensation Act does
not appear to address the problem through its waiver and walk
461
provision. The issue was not presented in Staab I. While the Staab
I analysis of the 2003 amendment to the Comparative Fault Act can
be applied in other cases where the fault of a nonparty is submitted
to the trier of fact, it is by one line of supreme court decisions
inapplicable in a case involving an employer.
On the other hand, the supreme court took the position early
on that the fault of the employer must be considered in any
allocation of fault arising out of a workplace accident. It does have
consequences, as Cambern illustrates, barring recovery where the
fault of the plaintiff is greater than the fault of the third party. If it
is considered for those purposes, it should arguably be considered

452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

557 N.W.2d 360, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 11 (2002).
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in cases where the fault of the third party is 50% or less, but not via
the route the supreme court took in Staab I. Rather, the analysis is
the result of the application of section 604.01, subdivision 1 of the
Comparative Fault Act as interpreted in Cambern.
In summary, there are two choices in considering Staab’s
impact on the third party claim. One, which follows the Kempa line
of cases, recognizes that the Comparative Fault Act is inapplicable
as a limitation on the fault of the employer, while at the same time
using the Act’s structure for the apportionment of fault. The other
is to assume that Staab overrides that line of decisions and applies
the rule of several liability to employers if they are found to be 50%
or less at fault. Cambern provides support for that proposition. If the
court applied the Comparative Fault Act to preclude a finding of
liability on the part of a third party manufacturer when its fault was
less than the fault of the plaintiff-employer, it is a short step to
apply the statute to limit the liability of the third party to its
percentage of fault if it is 50% or less.
VIII. CONCLUSION
462

In Staab I
the Minnesota Supreme Court answered the
important issue of the impact of the assignment of fault to a
nonparty. Through a creative use of the tools of statutory
construction the court reaffirmed the principle that the fault of a
nonparty could be considered and that it would have
consequences. The court held that the only defendant in the
litigation, the Diocese of St. Cloud, would be liable for only the
percentage of fault assigned to it. Because the diocese was found to
be 50% at fault, it was liable for only 50% of the plaintiff’s damages,
even though the other person (a party to the transaction leading to
the injury) was not joined in the litigation. In the second Staab
463
decision the court held that the Comparative Fault Act’s loss
reallocation provision could not be utilized to increase the
diocese’s liability beyond its 50% share of fault. Several liability
means what it says.
Together, then, the Staab decisions establish that the fault of a
nonparty may be submitted to the trier of fact in allocating fault
among the persons responsible for causing a plaintiff’s injuries,
that a party found to be 50% or less at fault is only severally liable
462.
463.

Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012).
Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2012).

6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

THE STAAB SAGA

6/24/2016 11:25 AM

1235

(absent a joint and several liability exception) even if it is the only
defendant in the suit, and that the loss reallocation statute cannot
be used to allocate any uncollectible share of the obligation
assigned to the nonparty to the severally liable party (absent a joint
and several liability exception).
The result in Staab I was certainly justifiable in terms of the
court’s prior precedent, even absent the fiction that “liability” exists
at the time of an accident, rather than judgment. Those cases
lacked a clear policy rationale, however, one that was not supplied
in Staab I. Staab II becomes easy in light of Staab I. Taking the
statute as a whole, several liability means several liability, and the
reallocation statute cannot be used to double down on the
obligation of the severally liable party. That is the important point
in Staab II.
The issue of whose fault will be considered in the allocation of
fault has been the subject of prior Minnesota cases, but even after
Staab I there are open questions concerning whose fault will be
considered. There are various cases where the issue has already
arisen and others that will likely arise in subsequent cases. This
short list includes cases where a party:
1. Has been released from litigation pursuant to a
Pierringer release;
2. Is identified and is a party to related litigation;
3. Is sufficiently identified to permit joinder;
4. Is sufficiently identified but cannot be joined because it
is not subject to service of process in Minnesota;
5. Is not liable because a statute of limitations has run;
6. Is a government employee protected from liability for
negligence by reason of official immunity; or
7. Is a person protected from liability for ordinary
negligence by reason of a statutory protection.
There are other issues remaining after the Staab decisions.
One concerns the impact of the loss reallocation statute after Staab
II. While the court barred its application to increase the liability of
a severally liable party, the court by no means read the loss
reallocation provision out of existence. There are various cases
where reallocation will apply, but a condition precedent will be a
finding that the party seeking to reallocate has paid more than his
or her fair share of the judgment and seeks to reallocate an
uncollectible share in part to other jointly and severally liable
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parties or to the plaintiff, because of an inability to shift the loss
through a contribution claim.
There is also a question concerning the impact of the Staab
decisions on the products liability reallocation provision in the
Comparative Fault Act. The key issue is whether the fault of parties
in the chain of manufacture and distribution will be limited to their
percentages of fault if 50% or less at fault. Given the nature of the
relationship of parties in the chain of manufacture and
distribution, coupled with the impact of section 544.41, the Staab
decisions should not in any way limit the liability of defendants in
the chain of manufacture and distribution.
The final issue concerns the impact of Staab I on third party
claims against employers for contribution. The issue is whether the
third party will be only severally liable if found to be 50% or less at
fault. That turns on whether the Comparative Fault Act applies to
those claims. The single decision on the issue, a federal district
464
court opinion, applied Staab I and held that it did. The result in
that case is sustainable, although its analytical path is questionable.
As a final point, the gaps in the comparative negligence statute
and the Comparative Fault Act over the years have been filled
through a series of decisions necessitated by those gaps. The
legislative march toward the adoption of several liability as the
default rule has been a road that the legislature left rough because
it used unclear and ambiguous language to express the key goal of
465
achieving several liability. If several liability is the goal, the
construction of the Comparative Fault Act in the Staab decisions
achieved that goal. It is important to be discerning in assessing the
impact of the decisions, however.

464. Gaudreault v. Elite Line Servs., LLC, 22 F. Supp. 3d 966 (D. Minn. 2014).
465. In King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492–93 (2015) (construing the
Affordable Care Act), the Supreme Court noted the basic principle that in cases
where the text of a statute is ambiguous, the “‘provision that may seem ambiguous
in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because
only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is
compatible with the rest of the law.’” Id. (citation omitted).

